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DISCRIMINATORY ACQUITTAL
Tania Tetlow*
ABSTRACT
This article is the first to analyze a pervasive and unexplored constitutional
problem: the rights of crime victims against unconstitutional discrimination by juries.
From the Emmett Till trial to that of Rodney King, there is a long history of juries
acquitting white defendants charged with violence against black victims. Modem
empirical evidence continues to show a devaluation of black victims; dramatic dis-
parities exist in death sentence and rape conviction rates according to the race of the
victim. Moreover, just as juries have permitted violence against those who allegedly
violated the racial order, juries use acquittals to punish female victims of rape and
domestic violence for failing to meet gender norms. Statistical studies show that the
"appropriateness" of a female victim's behavior is one of the most accurate predictors
of conviction for gender-based violence.
Discriminatory acquittals violate the Constitution. Jurors may not constitutionally
discriminate against victims of crimes any more than they may discriminate against
defendants. Jurors are bound by the Equal Protection Clause because their verdicts
constitute state action, a point that has received surprisingly little scholarly analysis.
Finally, defendants have no countervailing right to jury nullification based on race or
gender discrimination against victims. The Sixth Amendment promises defendants
an "impartial" jury, not a partial one.
Double jeopardy prohibits a direct remedy for the problem of discriminatory
acquittal, and jury secrecy makes proof difficult. Yet recognizing the unconstitu-
tionality of discriminatory acquittal would result in fundamental normative shifts.
It would create a new constitutional language for prosecutors and judges to protect
victims against jury discrimination within our existing criminal procedure. Most of
all, the pervasiveness of discriminatory acquittals could no longer serve as a legiti-
mating excuse for police and prosecutors to magnify the problem by conducting their
own anticipatory underenforcement of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1955, two white defendants faced judgment for the murder of Emmett Till,
confident that a jury of their peers would never convict for the killing of a black teen-
ager after he whistled at a white woman.' All-white Mississippi juries did not hold
' See generally M. SUSAN ORR-KLoPFER, THE EMMETr TILL BOOK (2005); M. SUSAN
ORR-KLOPFER, WHERE REBELS ROOST: MISSISSIPPI CIVIL RIGHTS REVISITED (2d ed. 2005);
THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE (CHRISTOPHER METRESS
ed., 2002); MAMIE TILL-MOBLEY & CHRISTOPHER BENSON, THE DEATH OF INNOCENCE: THE
STORY OF THE HATE CRIME THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2003); STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A
DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETr TILL (1988); THE UNTOLD STORY OF EMMETr
LOUIS TILL (Velocity/Thinkfilm 2005).
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men accountable for murders conducted to enforce the racial order, not even in the
spotlight of national publicity and outrage, not even a year after Brown v. Board
of Education.2 As a segregationist later proclaimed to Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, "'[y]ou cannot whip us' ... 'as long as we have the right of a jury trial."' 3
The Emmett Till trial is one example in a long history of what I term "discrimina-
tory acquittals," juries' acquittals of guilty defendants because of the race or gender
of the victim.4 For centuries, those who lynched black men, raped black women, or
beat their wives could count on walking away because juries refused to convict for
these crimes.' Modem statistics show continuing disparities in convictions and sentenc-
ing based upon the race of the victim.6 In the prosecution of gender-based violence,
juries put female victims on trial for their compliance with gender roles.' Studies
show that one of the most accurate predictors of conviction in rape cases is whether
the female victim behaved "appropriately."8 Discriminatory acquittals constitute
a massive and effectively ungoverned constitutional problem rarely mentioned by
scholars and never addressed by courts.9
Emmett Till's mother tried to shame the criminal justice system into enforcing
the right of her son to equal protection of the law. She held an open casket funeral
in Chicago where thousands stood in line to view Emmett's mangled body.l" She
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also supra note 1 (exploring other trials in the wake of the
acquittal).
I RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 66 (1997) (quoting telegram from
Nhagwin M. Jackson, District Attorney, State of Mississippi, to Robert Kennedy, May 14,
1964).
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra Part I.A.
6 See infra Part I.B.
7 See infra Part I.D.
8 See infra id.
9 See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 428
(1988) (discussing the failure of jurors to imagine blacks as victims in the context of the
Bernard Goetz acquittal and McCleskey v. Kemp); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317,
1325 n.25 (1997) (stating that "there is no legal literature dealing with acquittals"); Alexandra
Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1715, 1716-17 (2006) (noting that under-
enforcement of the law, as a general problem, is rarely addressed by scholars). See generally
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment, and the Supreme Court,
101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988). Kennedy describes potential remedies for race-of-the-victim
disparities in the application of the death penalty, considering, for example, eliminating the
death penalty or removing juries' discretion in imposing it, but he does not address the specific
rights of victims themselves. See generally Kennedy, supra. The Second Circuit mentioned
the issue in dicta in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1997) (considering
"whether a juror's intent to convict or acquit regardless of the evidence constitutes a basis
for the juror's removal during the course of deliberations under Rule 23(b)").
'0 See TILL-MOBLEY & BENSON, supra note 1, at 141.
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allowed Jet magazine to run gruesome photographs that spawned national pub-
licity about the impending trial." More than seventy reporters traveled to Sumner,
Mississippi to describe the segregated courtroom and the segregated jury, twelve white
men in a county that was sixty-three percent black.' 2 During closing arguments, the
defense attorney instructed the jurors on their racial duty, telling them that "every
last Anglo-Saxon one of you has the courage to free these men .... .""3 Despite
substantial evidence of the defendants' guilt, the jury deliberated a mere sixty-seven
minutes before acquitting. 4 Jurors told reporters that it would not have taken so
long, but they took a "soda pop break" so as to "make it look better."' 5 A few months
after the acquittal, Look magazine paid the defendants for an interview in which they
bragged with impunity about the murder.
6
Despite clear evidence that the jury in the Till case freed his killers based upon
discriminatory motives, Till's mother had no direct remedy for the injustice done to
her son. Double jeopardy protected the killers from re-prosecution; it also protected
them from an appeal of the acquittal based on defense counsel's outrageous closing
arguments. 7 Till's mother could not sue the jury itself for its discrimination against
her son because juries enjoy absolute immunity. 8 Moreover, she could not have
questioned the jury about their discriminatory motive because of the principle of
jury secrecy."
Regardless of the availability of remedy, it is critical to acknowledge that the
Till jury did not simply act unfairly. It violated the Constitution.2° In our focus on
the rights of defendants and the overenforcement of the law, we ignore the powerful
damage caused by discriminatory underenforcement of the law. When juries sanction
lynchings, hate crimes, rape and domestic violence-when juries tolerate violence
within minority communities and against women-they restrict the freedoms of
I Id. at 139.
12 See WHITFIELD, supra note 1, at 33, 35.
'3 TiLL-MOBLEY & BENSON, supra note 1, at 188.
14 Id. at 189.
1 Id.
6 Rebecca Leung, Justice, DelayedBut Not Denied: 60 Minutes Confirms Two Are Focus
of Emmett Till Murder Probe, CBS NEWS, Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2004/10/21/60minutes/main650652.shtml. Two months later, one of the defendant's friends
shot a black gas station attendant after an argument, and another all-white jury acquitted him
as well. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 62-63.
'" U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969)
(applying federal protection from double jeopardy to state courts as well).
8 See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396,403 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) ("[A]
petit juror is not liable for any statements made by him during the deliberations of the jury
after it has retired to consider a verdict, and that his privilege in this respect is not limited to
the words which are shown to be pertinent to the questions arising for decision.").
'9 See infra Part II.C.
20 See infra Part III.
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crime victims and the communities to which they belong. Discriminatory acquittals
send a message that government will provide less protection from violence based on
race or gender. This government complicity in private violence accomplishes more
to enforce the racial and gender order than does direct government discrimination.
In Part I, I describe the continuing history of discriminatory acquittals and the
ways in which juries have often refused to convict defendants for racially-motivated
violence against minority victims, for sexual violence against black women, or for
gender-based violence generally. While courts and scholars have grappled with jury
discrimination against defendants, they have ignored the equally long history ofjury
discrimination against victims. 21 Discriminatory acquittal persists as a wholly un-
answered constitutional problem. Empirical studies, including the Baldus study pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp,22 consistently show a lack of
empathy for minority victims. 23 The likelihood that ajury will convict a defendant or
impose the death penalty correlates to the race of the victim.24 In rape and domestic
violence cases, juries put female victims on trial for failing to meet their proper gender
roles instead of focusing on the defendant's behavior.25
Because of the dearth of case law or scholarship on the legal status of jury dis-
crimination against victims, in Part H1, I begin by examining the constitutional prohibi-
tion on jury discrimination against defendants. Appeals of discriminatory convictions
make clear that the Constitution forbids jury discrimination, but also that establish-
ing such discrimination proves difficult.26 In McCleskey v. Kemp, for example, the
Supreme Court rejected efforts to prove jury discrimination through statistical evi-
dence of racial disparities.27 Instead, the Court turned to procedural protections to try
to prevent discriminatory convictions, or at least to reduce them to a constitutionally
acceptable level of risk.28
In Part III, I argue that discriminatory acquittals also violate the Constitution.
A jury may not constitutionally acquit based on discrimination against the victims
of the crime any more than that jury could constitutionally convict a defendant based
2, Randall Kennedy compellingly documented the history ofthe racially unequal enforce-
ment of the law across the criminal justice system in Race, Crime, and the Law. KENNEDY,
supra note 3, at 29-135. He has also repeatedly urged a reassessment of the "disparate
impact" of law enforcement on minority communities to consider the public good ofprotect-
ing minority communities from crime. See generally Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal
Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1255 (1994) [hereinafter
Kennedy, Comment]; see also Kennedy, supra note 9.
22 See 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
23 See infra Part I.B (discussing empirical studies).
24 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87.
25 See infra Parts I.C and I.D.
26 See infra Part II.B.
27 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-97.
28 See id. at 308-09 ("The question is at what point that risk [of jury discrimination]
becomes constitutionally unacceptable." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
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on discrimination. It is one of the most basic tenets of equal protection law that
state actors may not discriminate based upon race or gender, particularly within crim-
inal trials.29
The application of equal protection doctrine to juries and victims raises several
important new questions. First, are jurors state actors? When we draft private citi-
zens for jury duty, are they then bound by the Constitution? This is a question that
has received only rare and peripheral discussion in legal scholarship, but I argue that
the answer is yes.3" The state has delegated to jurors the ultimate state power, the
power to set a man free or to send him to prison. This seemingly obvious point about
the state action ofjuries has fallen in the gaps between constitutional law and crim-
inal procedure scholarship. Much attention is paid to the capacity and bias ofjurors
and the correctness of their verdicts, but little to the direct constitutional governance
of juries.
The second question is whether there is a constitutional difference between a dis-
criminatory conviction and a discriminatory acquittal, and whether the defendant has
a competing constitutional right to jury nullification that trumps the victim's equal
protection rights.3 The right to ajury trial stands as a bulwark against overreaching
government prosecutions.32 I argue that this principle allows juries to do justice in
an individual case, but not to discriminate against the victim of a crime based on race
or gender. A defendant's right to jury lenity cannot trump the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that, whether or not a direct remedy exists, an acknowl-
edgement of discriminatory acquittals would create important normative shifts. Cur-
rently, police and prosecutors frequently refuse to enforce the law in the types of cases
in which juries devalue or discriminate against certain victims.33 By anticipating dis-
criminatory acquittals, the government magnifies their impact. If we understood,
however, that verdicts are state action and that discriminatory acquittals violate the
Constitution, juries could no longer serve as the excuse for discriminatory under-
enforcement of the law by police and prosecutors.
Ultimately, the problems of juries are the problems of society, prejudice, and
inevitable human fallibility. The instrumental solution to these problems must rely
on inexact procedural tinkering. I do not propose a fundamental reordering of our
criminal justice system to address discriminatory acquittals, but I do propose that we
strengthen the procedures already in place to minimize the risk of jury discrimina-
tion against defendants, and that we adapt those procedures to protect victims.' At
29 See infra Part II.B.
30 See infra Part III.A.
3' See infra Part III.D.
32 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
3 See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the use ofvoir dire, peremptory challenges, and the ban
on overt appeals to discrimination during trial).
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a minimum, acknowledging discriminatory acquittals would give judges and prose-
cutors constitutional language to invoke the equal protection rights of victims. Cur-
rently there is no such concept, and the system relies instead on the tepid language of
"public perceptions of fairness" or evidentiary notions of relevance. The Constitution
requires that our criminal justice system work to prevent discriminatory acquittals
just as it seeks to prevent discriminatory convictions.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATORY ACQUITTAL
Discriminatory underenforcement of criminal law matters as much as over-
enforcement. 5 Whether caused by active complicity or lack of empathy, government
underenforcement sends a message of the permissibility of race- and gender-motivated
violence. Minorities and women learn that certain kinds of beatings or rapes will go
unpunished. They learn which neighborhoods they are allowed to travel in and what
behavior will be deemed having "asked for it" if they seek justice.36 They learn that
the rules of the race and gender code will be enforced through violence and that gov-
ernment will turn a blind eye.
In this section, I describe the role juries play as the final arbiters of the discrimi-
natory underenforcement of the law. Underenforcement of the law involves a myriad
of discretionary decisions by police, probation officers, prosecutors, and judges. Even
if juries only rule on a small percentage of cases, however, perceptions about jury
biases shape the decisions of law enforcement. If juries refuse to convict a police
officer who assaults a black victim, or to convict a man who rapes an insufficiently
demure woman, then prosecutors will not bother to bring those cases or will plea
bargain them cheaply. Jury decisions form the relevant backdrop of the system and
the excuse for other acts of underenforcement.
The empirical evidence discussed below establishes three forms of discriminatory
acquittal by juries. First, usually in the context of race, some juries show outright
approval of the defendant's violence, like the murder of civil rights leaders. There are
fewer stark examples of these acquittals today and when they do happen, they often
spawn great publicity and protest.37 In the second form, usually in the context of
" See Natapoff, supra note 9, at 1759-60, 1772 ("The failure to enforce exposes resi-
dents to crime and insecurity, while reinforcing the idea that they have been abandoned by
the state.").
36 See id, at 1722-27.
3" See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, The Diallo Verdict: The Reaction; Verdict Bares Sharp
Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26,2000, at Al (outlining racial divisions follow-
ing acquittal of four police officers in the shooting death of an unarmed black man); Rocco
Parascandola, N.Y. Prepares for Verdict in 50-Shot Killings, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at
A21 (showing New York City's preparation for uprising in anticipation of the acquittal of
three police officers in the shooting of a black man); John Seewer, Ohio Officer Acquitted of
Killing Mom Holding Baby, Assoc. PRESS, Aug. 4, 2008, available at http://abcnews.com/
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gender, juries show disapproval of the victim's violation of hierarchical codes of
behavior. Just as juries once permitted the lynchings of black victims who violated
the racial code, so today do juries put the victims of gender-based crimes on trial.
Juries often refuse to punish the rapists of the wrong kind of women or the attackers
of wives who displease their husbands. Finally, in the context of race, empirical evi-
dence shows a general lack of empathy for black victims as such and an unwillingness
to value their suffering in the same ways as white victims.3"
A. Using Acquittals to Endorse Racial Violence After Slavery
Many of the conditions of slavery were reinstituted after Emancipation through
what the historian Eric Foner describes as a "wave of counterrevolutionary terror":
private violence conducted almost entirely without government interference.39 Riot-
ing whites committed pogroms on black communities, burning neighborhoods and
killing 280 blacks in Colfax, Louisiana in 1872, 46 blacks in Memphis in 1866, and
34 in New Orleans in 1866.40 More than 3000 individual lynchings singled out those
who allegedly violated the racial code, looked like someone who did, or happened to
be in the vicinity.4' Randall Kennedy argues that racial underenforcement of the law
US/comments?type=story&id=5513699 (referring to protests in wake ofpolice officer's ac-
quittal of misdemeanor charges of negligent homicide and negligent assault). Police brutality
acquittals, however, arguably belong in the third category: a lack of empathy for black victims.
Juries understandably give some deference to police claims of self-defense, but sometimes
seem to credit those claims more with minority victims.
38 See infra Part I.B.
39 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 425 (3d ed. 2002) ("[T]he wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts
of the South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart either in the American experience
or in that of the other Western Hemisphere societies that abolished slavery in the nineteenth
century."). See generally ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLuX KLAN
CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1995) (providing a history of post-
slavery violence against blacks). During the slavery era, the law expressly punished crimes
against white victims more harshly than against black victims. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The government sanction ofprivate violence to enforce the racial order mirrored slavery
itself. Slavery constituted a private ordering of power and violence condoned by the state
through its "private law" of property and contract. Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment banning
slavery is almost the only provision of the Constitution that governs private conduct. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
o FONER, supra note 39, at 261-63; KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 39,50; NICHOLAS LEMANN,
REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 3-29, 75-76 (2006).
41 See FONER, supra note 39, at 120; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918
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had greater historical consequences than racial overenforcement; it directly affected
more people and was more difficult to address.42 There were more lynchings during
Reconstruction than state executions of black people.43
The criminal justice system condoned the practice of lynching through three levels
of inaction and complicity-failure to arrest, to prosecute, and to convict. Police
arrested few of the killers of thousands of black victims even as newspapers publicly
celebrated the acknowledged perpetrators.' Prosecutors brought still fewer charges.45
Even had police and prosecutors had the desire and the courage to enforce the law,
the jury stood as the final and absolute level of protection for private racial violence.'
(Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1919) [hereinafter NAACP THIRTY YEARS] (providing a collection
of newspaper accounts); ROBERTL. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING,
1909-1950, at 4 (1980). Methods of lynching included hanging, burning at the stake, shooting,
and dismemberment. See generally NAACP THIRTY YEARS, supra. Lynchings were often
public events, featuring family gatherings. See, e.g., id. at 21,24-25. Bodies were sometimes
cut up into souvenirs for the crowd. See, e.g., id at 18, 24.
42 KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 29; see also Kennedy, Comment, supra note 21, at 1267
n.55 ("'[T]he most extensive and frequent losses of liberty are not due either to court or exec-
utive, but to the failure of the force of the government to protect men from violence and mobs.
The history of liberty could almost be written in terms of mobs that got away with it, and were
never punished-from the Tory-hunters of 1778 to the Ku Klux Klan of 1927."' (quoting
LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES: THE STORY OF THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1927))); Natapoff, supra note
9, at 1715-17; William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing 3-4 (Harv. Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 130, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=886170.
41 See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge ofSlavery: The Legal History of and Remedies
for, Prosecutorial Race-of- Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 24 (2006).
' See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 39-42 (1996) (discussing state
inaction over lynchings); Pokorak, supra note 43, at 24 (discussing a speech on the floor of
the U.S. Congress in 1921 defending the reasons for lynching a black man).
41 Predominantly black juries convicted lynchers in the Piedmont Counties during
Reconstruction, but those trials only occurred after President Ulysses S. Grant sent troops to
quell a "condition of lawlessness." FONER, supra note 39, at 457-58; see also Lou FALKNER
WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871-1872, at 1-2 (1996);
Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and ConstitutionalLegitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux
Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921, 925-28, 936-40 (1984). Congress repeatedly
failed to pass anti-lynching legislation. See Brian DeBose, Senate Regrets LynchingInaction,
WASH. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at A02; see also Holden-Smith, supra note 44, at 42-59.
4 In 1933, Professor James Chadbourn estimated that less than one percent of lynchings
since 1900 resulted in a conviction. JAMES HARMON CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAW
13 (photo. reprint 1970) (1933). Several of these rare convictions, based on federal prose-
cutions, were reversed by the Supreme Court on various grounds, including federalism and
state action. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (reversed and remanded
on error of trial judge with three Justices dissenting and arguing for reversal on federalism
grounds); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); see also KENNEDY, supra note
3, at 50-55.
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In the mid-20th century, when international publicity about the murder of civil rights
activists pressured prosecutors to bring the killers to trial, these trials routinely re-
sulted in race-based jury nullifications like that in the Emmett Till case.47 All-white
juries failed to convict Byron de la Beckwith for the murder of NAACP official
Medgar Evers, 48 acquitted most of the defendants accused of killing James Chaney,
Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwemer during the Freedom Summer of 1964, 49
and acquitted the killers of Viola Liuzzo, James Reeb, and Jonathan Daniels in the
1965 Selma, Alabama protests.50 Discriminatory acquittal represented the final bul-
wark of segregation. Even more than the silent inaction of police and prosecutors,
such jury verdicts made dramatic statements about the permissibility of racially moti-
vated violence.5'
B. Modern Racially Discriminatory Acquittals, a Racial Lack of Empathy
In recent decades, prosecutors have retried some of those murderers of civil rights
leaders and juries have promptly convicted them,52 but while the outright jury nullifi-
cation in race-based crimes has diminished, it has not ended.53 Archetypal cases con-
tinue to make clear that the problem remains.54 For example, there was little public
doubt that the predominantly white jury that acquitted the police officers charged with
beating Rodney King did so in furtherance of their racial discrimination against King,
41 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 61-67 (1994). See generally GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLBANOFF, THE RACE
BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION (2006)
(describing the role of the press in the civil rights struggle, including the Emmett Till trial).
48 John Herbers, Beckwith's 2d Trial Ends in Hung Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1964, at 1.
49 Although seven of the defendants were convicted, another eight were acquitted and
charges against three others were dismissed. Charges Dismissed in Rights Slayings, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1973, at 38; see also DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER(1988) (detailing
the Freedom Summer campaign and its impact).
so See MARY STANTON, FROM SELMA TO SORROW: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF VIOLA LIuzzo
48, 127-28 (1998). Some of these murder victims were themselves white, but violated the
racial code by working for the Civil Rights Movement.
"1 See, e.g., id. at 127 ("[T]he democratic process was going 'down the drain of irrational-
ity, bigotry, and improper law enforcement... now those who feel they have a license to kill,
destroy and cripple have been issued that license."' (quoting CHARLES W. EAGLES, OUTSIDE
AGITATOR: JON DANIELS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN ALABAMA 245 (1993))).
52 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1159-66 (2003).
s' See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE
CRIMES (2002) (describing the struggles of policing hate crimes).
' See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized
Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (describing the lynching of a Mobile man by the Klan
in 1984 and the subsequent trials); Carter, supra note 9, at 420-21 (describing acquittal of
Bernhard Goetz for the shooting of young black men on a subway, based on his unsupported
claim of self-defense).
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because a videotape of the beating provided such strong evidence of the defendants'
guilt." The perception of a discriminatory acquittal in that case, 6 and other police
brutality acquittals involving minority victims, spawned riots in Miami in 1980,"7
Los Angeles in 1992,58 and Cincinnati in 2001.59
The Rodney King jury did not crow about its acquittal in the way that the
Emmett Till jury did.60 Jurors today are less likely to perceive themselves as overtly
and proudly racist against victims. Instead, social science shows that Americans tend
to engage in a more subtle racial allegiance to their own race and discomfort with
others.61 This "racially selective empathy" remains a powerful influence in the under-
enforcement of criminal law.62
Empirical evidence confirms that juries on average value white victims more than
black victims, at least in the context of death penalty verdicts.63 In McCleskey v.
5' See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 3-17 (1991) (describing the Rodney King incident and the evidence of the
defendants' guilt); Robert Reinhold, Surprised, Police React Slowly as Violence Spreads,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al (describing the resulting riot, one of the most violent epi-
sodes in U.S. history). Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley stated that he was "outraged" by
the verdicts. Jane Fritsch, Los Angeles Mayor Criticizes Chieffor Slow Action on Riot, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1992, at Al. President George H.W. Bush found it "hard to understand how
the verdicts could possibly square with the video." Richard A. Serrano & Jim Newton, 3
King Case Defendants Notified of U.S. Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at Al.
56 See Robin Toner, US. Must Face Racial and Urban Problems, Many Say in Poll, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al.
5' 3 Die in Miami Riot After Ex-Policemen "s Acquittal, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1980, at Al.
58 See Reinhold, supra note 55.
5 See Howard Wilkinson, Curfew Quiets City Streets: State of Emergency Begins, CIN.
ENQUIRER, Apr. 13, 2001, at IA.
60 Seth Mydans, Storm ofAnger Erupts-National Guard Called into City, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1992, at Al.
6 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1017-25 (1988).
62 KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 384-85 (coining the term "racially selective empathy" and
discussing its role in the debate over the crack-powder distinction in drug laws).
63 There are advantages and disadvantages to comparing the problem of discriminatory
acquittals to death penalty sentencing verdicts. By design, death penalty decisions allow more
discretion and therefore may heighten the level of discrimination. On the other hand, defendants
facing the death penalty have already been convicted of a crime, so the jury's further decision
to inflict or spare the death penalty constitutes a more precise measure ofthe jury's valuation
of victims. Ultimately, it is very difficult to statistically isolate the various potential types of
discrimination because so many overlap, but it seems clear that discriminatory sentencing
disparities by juries based on the race of the victim exist. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Sorensen &
Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining the lssue ofRacialDisparity,
13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61, 63, 76-78 (1995) ("It is a commonplace in such research that race
discrimination at one stage of the process may obscure the effects of race discrimination at
another. For example, ifprosecutors systematically decline to press capital charges in murder
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Kemp, the defendant presented the Supreme Court with the most comprehensive
study of jury discrimination ever conducted to date, known as the Baldus study.64
It provided rigorous analysis of Georgia death sentences in the 1970s and showed
a profound racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty corresponding to
the race of the victim, much more so than to the race of the defendant.65 Juries were
4.3 times more likely to impose the death penalty for the killers of white victims than
for the killers of black victims, even after excluding 39 nonracial variables such as
the severity of the crime.66 By comparison, the disparity of death penalty verdicts for
black defendants versus other defendants was a multiple of 1.1.67 The Baldus study
mirrored and thus validated numerous previous studies.68
Studies of sentencing disparities continue to show jury discrimination against
victims. 69 In 1990, the General Accounting Office conducted an exhaustive review
cases involving black victims unless the nonracial features of the crime are particularly aggra-
vated [as compared with the sorts of murder cases involving white victims in which prosecutors
regularly press capital charges], the universe of cases presented for trial and sentencing is
skewed from the start. Thus, juries which appear to be meting out death sentences at the same
rate to killers of white victims and of black victims are actually electing death for killers of
black victims only in cases characterized as a class by a higher level of aggravation than is
present in the cases where juries elect death for killers of white victims.").
4 See 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987); see also Brief for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811)
(describing the Georgia study conducted by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues as
"among the best empirical studies on criminal sentencing ever conducted").
61 See Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 64, at 2-3; see also McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 286-87.
66 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
67 Id.
68 See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 266 (1990) ("[T]here is persuasive evidence that, in many juris-
dictions, defendants who killed white victims receive more punitive treatment than those whose
victims were black."). Baldus explained, "[t]o a surprising degree, the results of our study of
Georgia's capital-sentencing system both before and after Furman parallel the findings re-
ported for other jurisdictions." Id. at 265. Further, "this consistency in results, despite the weak-
nesses and limitations of virtually every study, tends to validate the findings of each." Id
69 See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DIsPARITIEs IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 109-110 (1989) ("[R]acial discrimination in the impo-
sition of the death penalty under post-Furman statutes... based on the race of the victim...
is a remarkably stable and consistent phenomenon .... Our conclusion rests on several dif-
ferent sets of data, from different states, analyzed in different forms; this provides 'convergent
validation' of our hypothesis and makes it particularly unlikely that a fortuitous association
or a peculiarity of the research design could have misled us."). Several studies have been
documented which show the disproportionate sentencing of blacks as compared to whites in
capital cases. Id at 66,68-69 (describing an Illinois study examining cases from 1976 to 1980);
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials:
1976-1991,20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 17,23-30 (1995) (describing a Kentucky study examining
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and statistical analysis of the various studies on racial disparities in the imposition
of the death penalty, which confirmed statistically significant racial discrimination
against victims.7" In 1998, another study showed statistical or "practically significant"
race-of-the-victim disparities in twenty-five states for some time period after the re-
imposition of the death penalty in 1972.7'
Because the Baldus study showed discrimination against victims more than de-
fendants, McCleskey was forced to make the contorted argument that his death pen-
alty verdict should be reversed because it was based in part on his choice of a white
victim. 72 Justice Brennan acknowledged in dissent, however, that the real issue was
the "devaluation of the lives of black persons., 73 Our criminal justice system treats
the murder of black people as less deserving of punishment, and yet we fail to conduct
any constitutional inquiry of the resulting equal protection violation.
Measuring the prevalence of discriminatory acquittal outside of the sentenc-
ing context is difficult, first because social scientists and legal scholars rarely study
cases from 1976 to 1991); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who
Will Die: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REv. 1, 17-29 (1991) (describ-
ing a Florida study examining cases from 1976 to 1987); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of
Discrimination in Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. CRIM.
JUST. 279, 281-83 (1987) (describing a Louisiana study examining cases from 1976 to 1982).
See generally Sorensen & Wallace, supra note 63, at 61,70-78 (describing a Missouri study
examining cases from 1977 to 1991).
70 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATrERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/
t2pbatl 1/140845.pdf, see also Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination andInstructional
Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 337, 353 (2000) (stating that "disparities were particularly evident in the conditions
where the defendant/victim characteristics were cross-racial, resulting in a one-third higher
percentage of death sentences for a Black defendant convicted of killing a White victim
(54%) than for a White defendant who killed a Black victim (40%)").
"' The states were: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. David C. Baldus et. al., RacialDiscrimination andthe Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELLL. REv. 1638, 1742-45 (1998). No race-of-the-victim effects
were found in Nevada; a practically significant reverse effect was found in Delaware; in the
remaining states, no studies had been done or sample sizes were too small to support an
estimate. Id.
72 McCleskey argued that he suffered from discrimination against victims in addition to
the direct discrimination against defendants also shown by the Baldus study, albeit at much
lower rates. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87, 291.
13 Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 29-75 (describ-
ing the long history of underenforcement of the law in black communities as a tool of racial
oppression); Carter, supra note 9, at 444 ("When flexible juries use their discretion to impose
the ultimate penalty, the lives of victims who happen to be black are simply worth less.").
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acquittals, and second, because it is difficult to say for sure that an acquitted defendant
was in fact guilty.74 As discussed below, however, empirical evidence does show a
marked disparity in rape convictions according to the race of the victim.
C. Condoning Sexual Violence Against Black Women
The most specific form of private violence used to enforce the oppression of
African-American women was sexual violence.75 Slave owners used rape both to
terrorize slaves and to replenish slave populations with their own children.76 While
racist rhetoric ironically decried the creation of a "mongrel breed" because of the
rape of white women by black men, the reality was that white men's rape of black
women created a large percentage of biracial people.77 Some state laws failed to
"' See Givelber, supra note 9, at 1325 & n.25. In fact, Givelber found that there was "no
legal literature dealing with acquittals" partly because ofthe difficulty of proving actual guilt.
Id. at 1325 n.25. See also Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation andData About the
Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2005) [hereinafter Givelber, Lost Innocence]
("Acquittals are the mystery disposition of the criminal justice system. We know very little
about them.").
" Kimberl6 Crenshaw has discussed the ways that antiracist descriptions of lynching and
feminist descriptions of rape disregard the particular experience of black women, effectively
compete with each other and thus lose power by their incompleteness. Kimberld Crenshaw,
Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist andAntiracist Appropriations ofAnita Hill, in RACE-
ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALREALITY, 402,405 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("Neither narrative
tends to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other; the reality of rape tends to be disregarded
within the lynching narrative; the impact of racism is frequently marginalized within rape
narratives.").
76 See MANNING MARABLE, How CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA:
PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 73-74 (1983) ("Raping the Black
woman was not unlike plowing up fertile ground; the realities of plantation labor descended
into the beds of the slaves' quarters, where the violent ritual of rape paralleled the harsh polit-
ical realities of slave agricultural production."). But see DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 29-30 (1997) ("[Sexual
violence's] intended long-term effect ... was the maintenance of a submissive workforce.
Whites' sexual exploitation of their slaves, therefore, should not be viewed simply as either
a method of slave-breeding or the fulfillment of slaveholders' sexual urges.").
77 GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, at 68-69 (1996). The history ofdispa-
rate acquittal rates by juries in rape cases is complicated by the use of rape in the racial over-
enforcement of the law against minority men. Crenshaw, supra note 75, at 419. The lynching
trope, the rape of white women by black men, had far more to do with white men's property
interest in their women than it did with protecting women's liberties. Id. at 416. Some have
also argued that the overenforcement ofrape laws against black men accused of raping white
women also made it less likely that black jurors would convict black men accused of raping
black women, because it has created a cultural climate that denies all rape accusations against
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recognize the rape of a slave woman, even by another slave, as a crime.78 After
slavery, the rape of black women by white men continued, with little hope of con-
viction by juries.7 9
Before 1977, while states could still execute defendants for rape, jury verdicts
demonstrated an extraordinary rate of disparate sentencing according to the race of
both the victim and the defendant.8" A Florida study from 1940 to 1964 showed that
only five percent of white male rapes of white women resulted in execution versus
fifty-four percent of black male rapes of white women.81 Not one of the eight white
black men. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Social Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories of
African-American Males About the Rape ofDesiree Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 997,
999-1006 (1992) (describing the author's own reflexive racial allegiance to Mike Tyson rather
than to his alleged victim). Clarence Thomas used the lynching trope to defend against accu-
sations of sexual harassment, even though his alleged victim was also black. See Crenshaw,
supra note 75, at 416.
78 KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 34-35; see also Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225,242 (Ga. 1852)
("The Penal Code was not intended to apply to slaves or free persons of color, in any of its
enactments, unless they are expressly mentioned."); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN,
ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 33 (1974) ("Rape meant, by definition, rape of white
women, for no such crime as rape of a black woman existed at law.").
" Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21
LAW & INEQ. 263,276 n. 101 (2003) ("There is no record of white men having been lynched
for the rape of a black woman, although by all accounts attacks on black women by white
men were not uncommon. It may be that the prevalence of these attacks formed part of the
basis of white southerners' obsession with black men raping white women. Nor were black
men lynched for raping black women. Prosecutions and convictions for the rape of black
women by men of any race were extremely rare during the first half of the twentieth century.
The rape of black women continues to be prosecuted less frequently and punished less severely
than that of white women.").
80 Marvin E. Wolfgang& Marc Riedel, Race, JudicialDiscretion, andthe Death Penalty,
407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 132 (1973) (finding that black defendants
whose victims were white were sentenced to death eighteen times more frequently than any
other racial combination). Rape executions constituted 11.1% of all executions from 1930 to
1950. Frank E. Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sci. 8, 10 (1952). This potential for racial discrimination in the imposition of the
death penalty, particularly for rape cases, helped to support the Supreme Court's limitation of
the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
81 See Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 80, at 125 (citing FLORIDA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
RAPE: SELECTIVE ELECTROCUTION BASED ON RACE (1964)). In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977), the Supreme Court banned the use of the death penalty in rape cases without
overt mention of these racial disparities, but they may well have helped motivate the Court's
decision. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 323-25; Barbara Holden-Smith, Inherently Unequal
Justice: Interracial Rape and the Death Penalty, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1571, 1572
(1996) (reviewing ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN, RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL
PuNISHMENT (1995)); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death
Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 27-28 (2002).
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men accused of raping a black woman received the death penalty. 2 Modem statistics
also show a marked disparity in conviction rates according to the race of the rape vic-
tim.83 Psychological studies of mock jurors confirm a bias against minority victims
in rape cases, particularly in interracial rapes."
D. Using Acquittals in Rape and Domestic Violence Cases to Enforce the Gender
Power Structure
Jury discrimination against women as such differs from discrimination based on
race. Jurors do not express a systematic undervaluing of women as victims of all
violent crimes, and indeed, may well judge some violent crimes committed against
women more harshly in the name of protecting women. We are willing to see women
in the role of victims in a way that we do not recognize black people as victims.85 Cer-
tain categories of violence, however, serve to enforce the gender order. Male violence
(particularly sexual violence) against wives, girlfriends, or acquaintances enforces
gender hierarchy and is routinely condoned by police, prosecutors, and juries.86
82 Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 80, at 125 (citing FLORIDA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
RAPE: SELECTIVE ELECTROCUTION BASED ON RACE (1964)).
83 See GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 219-20 (1989); see also Cassia Spohn et al., Prosecutorial Justifications
for SexualAssault Case Rejection: Guarding the "Gateway to Justice ", 48 SOC. PROBS. 206,
210 (2001) (correlating race matters to prosecution rates); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism,
and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 110-16, 121-22 (1983).
84 See generally Hubert S. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions: A Psycholegal
Analysis of the Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAv.
261 (1979); Robert W. Hymes et al., Acquaintance Rape: The Effect of Race of Defendant
and Race of Victim on White Juror Decisions, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 627 (1993) (studying
white mock jurors in cases of consent ambiguity in rape cases, finding that both females and
males were more likely to convict when the defendant-victim combination was interracial;
there was no significant difference when the defendant-victim combination was white-black
or black-white).
85 See generally Carter, supra note 9 (discussing the difficulty of perceiving blacks as the
victims of violent crimes in comparison to willingness to see whites as the "victims" of affir-
mative action); Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of Discrimination ": Race-Gender
Analogies in Legal andHistorical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001) (discussing benefits
and pitfalls of comparisons of racial and gender oppression). The differential in rape convic-
tion rates shows the way that black women benefit less from the perception of white women
as victims.
86 Mayeri, supra note 85, at 1081-83 (describing the ways in which proponents of the
Violence Against Women Act's civil rights remedies made comparisons between racially moti-
vated crimes and the underenforcement of gender-based violence); Leti Volpp, Feminism
Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1181, 1199-1200 (2001). Violence against
women is not typically accompanied by the same outright expressions of gender hatred as
racially-motivated crime. Birgit Schmidt am Busch, Domestic Violence and Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
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Like racial violence, gender-based violence serves an important role in enforcing
the power structure. As Randall Kennedy noted, "[w]hat rape is to women, lynchings
were to blacks: a constant threat shaping daily decisions from choice of demeanor
to choice in clothing."87 The purposes and effects of gender-based violence are clear
in countries around the world, where rape and domestic violence (or honor killings
and dowry murders) restrict women's personal freedom and limit their political and
economic power.88
Historically, the common law made explicit the connection between violence
and the legal prerogatives of men. Blackstone minimized the crime of murdering
one's wife, but declared a wife's murder of a husband akin to treason.89 The "rule
of thumb," enforced by American courts into the nineteenth century, allowed a hus-
band the right of chastisement of his wife so long as he beat her with a switch no
wider than his thumb.90 Raping one's wife was not outlawed in all states until very
recently.9' In the later nineteenth century, the law eased its enforcement of men's
right to chastisement, but accomplished the same goal through underenforcement
of the law and complicity in private violence.92 Courts relegated women brutalized
by their husbands to the private sphere of the family, stripped, as a practical matter, of
any protections of the criminal justice system.93
Government sanction of gender-based violence through the underenforcement
of the law continues. According to a 1993 U.S. Senate Committee report, "[s]tudy
after study has concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often
14-17 (1995). See generally David Frazee, An ImperfectRemedyforlmperfect Violence: The
Construction of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
163 (1993).
87 KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 46. And, of course, the sexual violence perpetrated against
the female half of the black population involved an inextricable mix of race and gender
discrimination.
88 Volpp, supra note 86, at 1186-90 (arguing that we acknowledge the use of private
violence to subordinate women in other countries, but see it as merely aberrant in our own).
89 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 113-14
(2000).
90 Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157 (1824). In one historic exception, the
Puritans enacted the first laws anywhere in the world against wife-beating and child abuse
from 1640 to 1680. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POUCY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987).
9" See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper
Influence: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1497 (2003).
Moreover, as of 2003, only twenty-four states and the District ofColumbia had abolished the
marital rape exemption within tort law, and the other twenty-six states retained some form
of marital immunity. Id. at 1468-70.
9 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47-51 (1992).
9' PLECK, supra note 90, at 3-9.
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treated less seriously than comparable crimes affecting men."94 Domestic violence
and rape remain the most under-reported violent crimes because of shoddy treatment
of victims by the criminal justice system as well as the public shaming attached to
women who report these crimes.9' When women do report violence or rape by a part-
ner, police are famously reluctant to act.96 Prosecutors further underenforce the law
by undercharging or dropping the cases altogether.9 7 All of these decisions are made,
moreover, in the shadow of discriminatory acquittals.9 8 Studies show that police and
prosecutors frequently discourage or plead down charges because of concern about
juror willingness to convict for gender-based violence. 99 Discriminatory acquittals
thus generally form the excuse for discriminatory underenforcement.
Despite the frequency of domestic violence (which comprises around twenty per-
cent of all non-fatal violent crimes against females age twelve or older),"° few such
94 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (1993). The Violence Against Women Act created a civil
rights remedy (later struck down as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authorization)
because "victims of gender-motivated violence have a right to equal protection of the laws,
including a system ofjustice that is unaffected by bias or discrimination and that, at every
relevant stage, treats such crimes as seriously as other violent crimes." S. REP. No. 102-197,
at 28 (1991).
9' Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1161 (1986) (noting that violent, stranger rape
is frequently reported, while non-violent, non-stranger rape is often not reported, even when
the victim considers rape to have occurred). The Department of Justice reports that only thirty-
six percent ofcompleted rapes, thirty-four percent ofattempted rapes, and twenty-six percent
of sexual assaults are reported to police. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992-2000,
at 2 tbl.3 (2002), available athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsarpOO.pdf; see also Zanita
E. Fenton, Silence Compounded-The Conjunction of Race and Gender Violence, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 271,279 (2003) ("[S]cholars generally acknowledge that domestic
violence offenses are greatly under-reported ... ."); Thekla Hansen-Young, Considering the
Constitutionality of a Confrontation Clause Exception for Domestic Violence Victims, 14
BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 88 (2005) (discussing one study which found that only 6.7% of
spousal assaults were reported).
' Zorza, supra note 92, at 47-48. Some police departments even had policies in place
to downplay domestic violence disputes. Id. (reporting on municipal procedures in Oakland
and Detroit).
7 Spohn et al., supra note 83, at 209-10.
98 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2463, 2465 (2004).
99 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29 (1987) (noting problems for prosecutors in dis-
tinguishing between "jump-from-the-bushes stranger rapes and the simple cases of unarmed
rape by friends, neighbors, and acquaintances"); see also Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims'
Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 SOC. PROBS.
213, 213-14 (1991) (noting that prosecutors worry about jury results, and specify typical
bases for case rejection).
'00 CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv0l.pdf.
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cases go to jury trials charged as felonies. I 1 In those rare trials, the most effective
defense against domestic violence charges centers on the imposition of gender roles-
challenging the victim as a consenting masochist or as a nag deserving of disci-
pline.10 2 Indeed, as women gained more liberties during the twentieth century, juries
actually became less likely to convict in domestic violence cases.'0 3 Juries seemed
to worry less about men's violence than about blaming female victims who did not
exercise their supposed new autonomy in order to leave their abusive husbands."°
The law of rape actively encourages a jury to put the victim, rather than the
defendant, on trial by focusing on her lack of consent and on whether she adequately
resisted, rather than on the defendant's intent to rape. 5 Juries show bias for the de-
fendants in rape trials when there are suggestions of "contributory behavior" by the
victims. 10 6 A rape trial frequently devolves into whether the victim properly met her
gender role, whether she was sufficiently innocent and virginal, whether she showed
a willingness to fight to the death rather than lose her virtue, and whether she assumed
'0' See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police
Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 297, 307 (1993); Cheryl Hanna, No Right
To Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1859 & n.30 (1996). In New Orleans in 2007, for example, approximately ninety
percent of domestic violence arrests were booked as municipal misdemeanors. Of those that
were sent to state court, seventy-four percent were dropped immediately by the district attor-
ney's office. E-mail from Nathaniel Weaver, Domestic Violence Program Coordinator, City
of New Orleans, to Tania Tetlow, Associate Professor and Director, Tulane Law School
Domestic Violence Clinic (Mar. 4, 2008, 15:56 EST) (on file with author).
102 Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2133-34 & n.60 (1996). As an Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecuting a rare
federal domestic violence-related case, I had to object to the relevance of defense counsel ques-
tions focusing on whether the defendant paid for the car of his victim and whether she was
dating someone new, seemingly irrelevant to the issue of whether he broke down her door
and used it to beat her over the head.
103 Id. at 2170.
104 LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LivEs: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960, at 282-83 (1988). There is no meaningful way to compare con-
viction rates for gender-based violence because such crimes by definition disproportionately
affect women. Perhaps the only useful comparison is to compare the murder sentencing rates
for men convicted of killing their wives to women convicted of killing their husbands. Women
who kill their husbands (many of whom alleged self-defense) tend to receive much harsher
sentences than men who kill their wives-an average of 15 years for women versus 2-6
years for men. MICHIGAN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CLEMENCY FOR BATTERED
WOMEN IN MICHIGAN: A MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS, LAW STUDENTS AND SOCIAL WORKERS
(1998), at ch. 1, http://www.sado.org/clemency.htm.
1o5 See ESTRICH, supra note 99, at 18-20.
106 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-51 (1966). This study
remains the most extensive study of acquittals. See Givelber, Lost Innocence, supra note 74,
at 1167.
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the risk by being alone with a man. 1 7 Studies of prosecutors show that the factors
they deem most important to successful convictions by juries focus almost entirely
on the victim: a stranger relationship between perpetrator and victim, a lack of any
voluntary interaction between perpetrator and victim before the rape, a high degree
of force, a high degree of resistance, and corroboration.'°8
When jurors acquit a defendant because they believe that the female victim failed
to meet the strictures of her gender role, they use acquittal to enforce the rules of
discrimination. Just as the Emmett Till jury made clear that black teenagers should
not whistle at white women by acquitting Till's murderers,"° juries use acquittals to
enforce the rules by which women are to behave. The frequency of these discrimi-
natory acquittals is measured by a unique attempt at a legislative fix. Rape shield
statutes became necessary precisely because defense lawyers were effectively attack-
ing female victims for their sexual history-sending a clear message to women that
only the virtuous and conformist will be protected by juries against sexual violence."'
E. The Impact of Discriminatory Acquittals
The general failure to protect certain groups from crime devalues those groups
and restricts their freedom. Law enforcement is a public resource, capable of being
inequitably distributed.11' The striking refusal to enforce rape, sexual assault, and
domestic violence laws has a demonstrated impact on women's ability to participate
in the market, to move freely, and to live." 2 An estimated one in six women will be
107 ESTRICH, supra note 99, at 18-19.
10' Givelber, Lost Innocence, supra note 74, at 1171-74, 1179.
"09 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
"o See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 412 advisory committee's note (describing legislative history
of the federal rape shield statute and congressional intent to prevent "inquisitions into the
victim's morality" and "sexual stereotyping"). Many studies illustrate that rape shield statutes
and statutory rape reforms have not significantly changed the results in rape prosecutions of
civil tort claims. See CASSIA SPoHN & JULIA HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 77-104 (1992) (finding no identifiable change in sexual assault
reports, indictments, or convictions after the statutory reform); Ronet Bachman & Raymond
Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We
Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 573 (1993) ("[S]tatutory rape law reform
has not had a very substantial effect on either victim behavior or actual practices in the crim-
inal justice system."); see also Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda
for the Next Thirty Years ofRape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 467,469-471 (2005).
..' See Natapoff, supra note 9, at 1725.
112 G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the Underground: Battered Women, the State, and
Conceptions ofAccountability, 23 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 133, 134 (2000) ("I live in a world
where to be female is to be a target of hatred, of physical violence, and of torture."). Congress,
in passing the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, cited statistics
related to the impact of domestic violence on commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 631-35 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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raped in their lives," 3 and one in four women will be raped and/or physically assaulted
by a husband or boyfriend." 4
Likewise, the disparate failure to enforce the law within minority communities
leaves citizens prisoners within their homes, fearing violent crime that would never
be tolerated in other neighborhoods. Until ten years ago, the rate of violent crime gen-
erally against black victims was significantly higher,"5 and the rape rate of African-
American women was higher than that of white women.1 6 Discriminatory acquittal
condones certain types of private violence and thus makes it more likely to occur.
Permitted private violence more effectively enforces the racial and gender order
than does overt government action. Lynchings and the assassinations of civil rights
workers protected the rules of segregation more than did government arrests. Rape
and domestic violence constantly remind women of their vulnerability to male power,
keeping them from having illusions about their rights to participate in the market
place or within family structures on an equal basis. Women understand that they are
likely to be raped, or beaten by a partner, and that the perpetrator will almost certainly
walk away free.
Discriminatory acquittal is but a subset of the greater problem of discriminatory
underenforcement of the law, but it is an overlooked root of the problem. Discrimi-
natory acquittal makes arrest and prosecution pointless and thus less likely. Jury dis-
crimination serves as the main reason, and sometimes the excuse, for an entire system
of discriminatory underenforcement. Yet, there is no constitutional language to con-
demn discriminatory acquittals as denying women and minorities equal protection
of the law.
II. DISCRIMINATORY CONVICTIONS
I begin with an overview of the ways courts have grappled with jury discrimination
against defendants rather than victims because a few appellate courts have addressed
'13 See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii (2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/210346.pdf.
14 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE iii (2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1 /nij/181867.pdf.
"' The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported findings from the National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS) from 1993 through 1998. CALLI RENNiSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT
VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993-1998(2001), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wr98
.pdf. "[F]rom 1993 to 1997, black persons were victimized at rates significantly greater than
those of whites. By 1998 black and white persons were victimized overall at similar rates."
Id. at 1. In 1993, 53.5 whites per "1,000 persons age 12 or older" were victims of crimes of
violence while 69.3 blacks per "1,000 persons age 12 or older" were violent crime victims.
Id. at 11. In 1994, whites had a rate of 52.8 per 1000 and blacks a rate of 64.8 per 1000. Id.
By 1998, 38.1 per 1000 whites were victimized while 42.8 per 1000 blacks were victimized.
Id.; see also Kennedy, Comment, supra note 21, at 1255-57 (relating race to crime statistics).
16 Recent Department of Justice statistics indicate that these disparities have dissipated
to statistical insignificance. RENNISON, supra note 115, at 1.
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the issue in this context."7 The decisions governing what I will term "discriminatory
convictions" provide a framework with which to structure a constitutional analysis
of discriminatory acquittal. These cases make clear that jury discrimination against
defendants is unconstitutional, but also that it is almost impossible to prove." 8
Consideration of discriminatory convictions establishes three things that are
important to a consideration of discriminatory acquittals. First, juror discrimination
against defendants is clearly unconstitutional: the Constitution requires an "impartial
jury" regulated by the Equal Protection Clause."9 Second, although statistical evi-
dence proves the existence ofjury discrimination, it is very difficult to prove in indi-
vidual cases. Even if you could require jurors to testify about their racial motives,
which jury secrecy prevents, verdicts are rendered by multiple individuals with a com-
plex mix of conscious and subconscious motives. Third, the Supreme Court relies
primarily on procedural regulation ofjury selection in an attempt to minimize the risk
of jury discrimination; it is these kind of procedures that I argue in Part IV should be
made available to protect against discriminatory acquittal.
A. Jury Discrimination Is Unconstitutional
In the handful of appellate opinions addressing alleged jury discrimination, the
procedural posture typically involves the following: a post-conviction report by ajuror
alleging that other jurors used racial slurs, a refusal by the trial judge to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing, and a resulting appeal. 2° Defendants ask appellate courts to reverse
and remand for an inquiry into the jury's deliberations, sometimes long after the actual
verdict.' 2 ' Courts have reversed convictions, or remanded for evidentiary hearings on
the issue ofjury discrimination, based on three separate but sufficient constitutional
", See infra note 120.
8 I also begin my analysis by focusing on race because I find no cases addressing specific
allegations ofjury discrimination against female defendants as such.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120 See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2003) (jurors allegedly told racial
jokes about the defendant and voted against the death penalty because they wanted him to go
back to prison and kill more black inmates); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 15 (Conn. 1998)
(one juror alleged that another juror had repeatedly called the defendant a "spic"). In United
States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1525-26 (11 th Cir. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
conviction based on admissions by some of the jurors that they used religious epithets against
a Jewish defendant. Presumably when trial judges hold such evidentiary hearings, or even
reverse based on the results, the government rarely appeals, and I find no such opinions.
121 See, e.g., Marshall, 854 So. 2d at 1242 (granting post-conviction relief, requiring an
evidentiary hearing into jury misconduct fourteen years later); Santiago, 715 A.2d 1 (reversing
and remanding for evidentiary hearing); State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1995) (revers-
ing and remanding for evidentiary hearing into allegations jury overheard racial slurs made
by government officials). But see Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 1990) (affirming
conviction despite ajuror's affidavit alleging that she overheard two otherjurors using racial
comments about the defendant, and the trial judge's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing).
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principles: the Equal Protection Clause, 122 the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury, 123 and the due process rights to a fair trial. 24 These opinions tend to conflate the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury with the equal protection doctrine that
racial discrimination is the worst form of impartiality. The Eleventh Circuit summed
up the blending of these doctrines: "The obvious difficulty with prejudice in ajudicial
context is that it prevents the impartial decision-making that both the Sixth Amendment
and fundamental fair play require."' 25 Similarly, other courts have invoked procedural
due process as a way of essentially summarizing and incorporating the other rights
at issue-the right to an impartial jury and equal protection rights against discrimina-
tion."'26 Unsurprisingly, I find no court that argues that ajury could constitutionally
convict a defendant based upon his race.
B. Difficulties of Proof
There is substantial historical and empirical evidence that discriminatory con-
victions exist, yet opinions considering the issue are rare, and reversals even more
so. 27 Direct evidence of discrimination by a particularjury, as opposed to statistical
evidence of discrimination by juries generally, is difficult to uncover because the law
protects the secrecy of jury deliberations. Further, courts have difficulty defining the
requisite level of discriminatory motive, much less grappling with unstated or sub-
conscious discrimination. Few modern juries will collectively brag about their overt
and conscious racism in the way the Emmett Till jury did.
122 See, e.g., Marshall, 854 So. 2d at 1241 (relying on Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.
2d 354 (Fla. 1995) and explicitly discussing equal protection jurisprudence).
23 See, e.g., Brown, 668 A.2d 1288. The Eleventh Circuit has also applied Sixth
Amendment analysis to religious discrimination. See Heller, 785 F.2d at 1525-26 (reversing
a conviction because, among other reasons, jurors reportedly used religious epithets against
a Jewish defendant).
124 See, e.g., Tavares v. Holbrook, 779 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1985) (applying due process to a
claim that ajuror used a racial term during deliberations). Sometimes, jurors report racial dis-
crimination during jury deliberation, although government cross-appeals of these decisions
are rare. See United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1188 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 920 (2001) (noting approvingly the removal of a juror based upon her racial com-
ments, citing defendant's due process rights, and affirming trial court's decision not to find
a mistrial).
125 Heller, 785 F.2d at 1527 (addressing both racial and religious prejudice).
126 See, e.g., Tavares, 779 F.2d at 2 (in addressing a claim that a juror used a racial slur
during deliberations, the court invoked Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), for the propo-
sition that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a fair trial by impartial jurors as a minimal
standard of due process).
127 KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 76-135 (discussing the history and current evidence ofram-
pant discriminatory convictions); id. at 277-82 (discussing the paucity of reported decisions
addressing discriminatory convictions).
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In contrast to other governmental decision-making, juries work in absolute
secrecy, deliberating in private and without transcription.' As the Supreme Court
noted in McCleskey v. Kemp, this makes it almost impossible to prove a jury's alleged
discriminatory motive. a29 Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits jurors from
testifying about jury deliberations, with the exception of questioning jurors about
an "extraneous influence.'
130
Defendants have argued that racial prejudice falls within Rule 606(b)'s exception
for "extraneous influences" and have asked to question jurors about potential dis-
crimination.13 ' The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, but generally defines
"extraneous influence" quite strictly. In Tanner v. United States, for example, the
Court famously held that a juror's intoxication during trial did not constitute an
"extraneous influence.' 32
Alcohol would seem to be far more extraneous than a juror's racist ideology.
Despite Rule 606(b), however, when a juror has actually reported alleged jury dis-
crimination, several state appellate court decisions have reversed a trial judge's refusal
to hold an evidentiary hearing. 133 Those courts did not so much define prejudice as an
outside influence, but trumped the rule of jury secrecy to protect the constitutional
128 See generally Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries,
and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REv. 771 (2005) (arguing for an amendment of
jury secrecy rules in capital cases to prevent against prejudicial and erroneous decision-
making). Jury secrecy has beenjustified on several policy grounds: (1) preserving the finality
ofverdicts from speculation aboutjury deliberations; (2) deference for the jury's role as fact-
finder, a role that would be challenged ifjudges could simply substitute their ownjudgments;
(3) avoiding the harassment ofjurors after a verdict; (4) fostering free and open deliberations
by jurors without concern for future embarrassment; and (5) preserving public confidence
in the jury (by hiding the quality of deliberations from the public). Id. at Part IV.B.
129 481 U.S. 279, 308-09 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.8 (1986)).
130 See FED. R. EvlD. 606(b) ("Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith. But ajuror may testify about (1) whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there
was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of
any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying.").
131 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
132 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987).
3 See Wright, 559 F. Supp. at 1151 ("Despite the broad language of Rule 606(b), courts
faced with the difficult issue of whether to consider evidence that a criminal defendant was
prejudiced by racial bias in the jury room have hesitated to apply the rule dogmatically."
(citing Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Smith v. Brewer, 444
F. Supp. 482, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1978))).
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interests of a convicted defendant in the interest of the "plainest principles ofjustice."'
The Florida Supreme Court, for example, requires investigation of any allegations of
overtly racist jury deliberations.135 The court draws a bright line rule requiring inves-
tigation into "overt acts" of racist jury comments, but not into unspoken racial bias. 36
In the Florida case of Marshall v. State, ajuror reported racial slurs against both the
black defendant and the murder victim.137 Somejurors, she alleged, voted against the
death penalty for a prison murder because they wanted to send Marshall back to prison
to "kill more black inmates.' '38 The Supreme Court of Florida granted post-conviction
relief and ordered an evidentiary hearing fourteen years after Marshall's original trial.'39
Despite the strong interest in finality ofjudgments, in protecting the privacy and integ-
rity of jury deliberations, in preventing juror harassment, and in "'maintaining public
confidence in the jury system,"' the court found that racial bias is among the "most
serious" possible allegations of juror misconduct and must be investigated. 4 '
Even if a defendant could question jurors about discrimination, however, courts
would still stumble over the question of defining unconstitutionally racist motive.
Does racism need to be the sole motive for the verdict? Does racism need to be con-
scious and spoken?'4 ' Does one racist juror undermine the entire verdict? Two? All
twelve?142 The U.S. Supreme Court has never defined the level of discrimination that
114 As the Supreme Court noted in McDonald v. Pless, "there might be instances in which
such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without 'violating the plainest principles
of justice."' 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915) (internal citations omitted). In Wright v. United
States, the district court explained, "[c]ertainly, if a criminal defendant could show that the
jury was racially prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without trampling the sixth
amendment's guarantee to a fair trial and an impartial jury." 559 F. Supp. at 1151 (citing Tobias
v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. at 1290; Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. at 490).
13 See Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (Fla. 2003).
136 See id.
137 Id. at 1239.
138 Id.
119 Id. at 1244.
140 Id. at 1243-44 (internal citations omitted).
141 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, in A READER ON RACE, CIvIL RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN LAW: A
MULTIRACIAL APPROACH 127-130 (Timothy Davis et al. eds., 2001); Johnson, supra note
61, at 1017-21; Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good
Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1141 (2007); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1, 45 (2006) ("Courts are hostile to disparate im-
pact law for precisely the same reason that they hesitate to read disparate treatment doctrine
as embracing implicit bias-because actions taken without a conscious intent to discriminate
do not fit the paradigm of a fault-based understanding of 'discrimination."'); Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1230 (1999) (concluding that "nothing more
should be done within the existing legal framework to address unconscious disparate treatment"
because it is not possible to detect unconscious bias).
142 See Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
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would render a verdict unconstitutional.'43 In fact, even within the broader equal pro-
tection doctrine, the Supreme Court varies widely in defining the permissible degree
of race consciousness in governmental decision-making.'"
In most of the cases cited above, appellate courts merely remanded for an evi-
dentiary hearing and thus did not define the requisite level of racism, but two cases
provide extremes of the possible requisite levels of proof. The Eleventh Circuit
simply reversed the conviction of a Jewish defendant based, in part, on reports that
several of the jurors used religious slurs.' The court found that such bias within the
jury violated due process.'" In stark contrast, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of a habeas corpus in Spencer v. State, despite a juror's affidavit claiming
to have overheard jurors using racial epithets about the defendant. '47 The court rea-
soned that, even assuming the truth of the allegations, "it shows only that two of the
twelve jurors possessed some racial prejudice and does not establish that racial prej-
udice caused those two jurors to vote to convict Spencer and sentence him to die."' 4
Defining the requisite level of bias to allow an appellate court to reverse a conviction
remains difficult, particularly in the context of secret group decision-making made by
a body whose decisions are accorded great deference by our criminal justice system.
C. Using Statistics to Prove the Likelihood of Jury Discrimination
A defendant suspicious ofjury discrimination thus has to hope that racist jurors
articulated those ideas out loud during the trial and that another juror will bravely de-
cide to report the comments. Because defendants face such insurmountable difficulties
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 538 (2001).
143 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). McCleskey assumes that proof of dis-
criminatory motive by the defendant's jury would render a verdict unconstitutional, but does
not describe the requisite level of discrimination. See id.
'" At the greatest extreme, the Court in the Batson v. Kentucky line of cases seemed to pro-
hibit any degree of race consciousness in exercising a peremptory challenge during jury selec-
tion. See Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation,
and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 101-02 (1996). In the legislative redistricting
line of cases, the Court took a middle ground and forbade race consciousness that provides
the "predominant reason" for legislative redistricting. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
928 (1995). The Court created the lowest standard of all in the context of racial profiling,
allowing race to be considered as a factor to establish "reasonable and articulable suspicion"
for stopping a suspect, so long as race is not the sole reason for the stop. See United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 & n. 16 (1976).
141 See United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing a
conviction because, among other reasons, jurors reportedly used religious epithets against
a Jewish defendant during deliberations).
'46 See id. at 1529.
14' 398 S.E.2d 179, 184 (Ga. 1990) (holding that allegations of racial prejudice do not
supersede Rule 606(b)'s prohibition on inquiring into jury deliberations).
148 Id. at 185.
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of proof, defense lawyers instead have turned to statistical studies of collective jury
verdicts to show the ubiquity ofjury discrimination. For example, defendants chal-
lenged the death penalty as inherently racist in its application by showing a strong
correlation between race and sentencing.'49
In 1987, the defendant in McCleskey v. Kemp presented the Supreme Court with
the Baldus study, the most elaborate and statistically accurate study conducted to that
point.5 ' As described above in Part I, the Baldus study showed a disparity in the
application of the death penalty according to the race of the defendant, but also a much
larger disparity in the application of the death penalty according to the race of the
victim.'5 ' In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that statistical evidence thatjuries collec-
tively tend to discriminate would not prove that McCleskey's jury did discriminate.' 52
The Court acknowledged that the rules ofjury secrecy would make this proof almost
impossible; nevertheless, McCleskey could not substitute statistical likelihood for
direct evidence in his case. i53
The Court rejected the contention that the death penalty must be abandoned
because it is sometimes discriminatorily applied, in part because such logic could
undermine the entire criminal justice system."' If race infects convictions or other
sentences, how could the Court strike down the entire jury system as a remedy?'55
Instead, the Court described an acceptable level of risk.1 56 "There is, of course, some
risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case.... The ques-
tion 'is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable. "",5 The Court
raised the pragmatic fact that the motives of jurors are generally unknowable and
treated it as constitutional principle, holding that the risk of discrimination can exist
at a constitutionally acceptable level.' The Supreme Court essentially admitted that
it lacked the ability to root out racial discrimination from the jury system.'59
"' Brief for Petitioner at 56, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444).
5 See 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
... Id. at 286. The Supreme Court considered McCleskey's claim without expressing any
concern about a defendant complaining of discrimination against victims. Carter, supra note
9, at 440-41, 443-44; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1389.
152 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313-14.
1 See id. at 312; see also Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1419-21 (criticizing the Court's failure
ofjudicial imagination and leadership in McCleskey).
"' See Carter, supra note 9, at 446 ("No wonder nine Justices tiptoed around the matter:
Sometimes the exposure of the pervasiveness of racialism, and of the racist policy it entails,
can cost too much.").
'.. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-15. The Court also expressed concern that such rights
could even apply to gender. Id. at 316-17. The dissent dismissed these slippery slope arguments
as "a fear of too much justice." Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 308-09.
m Id. (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.8 (1986)).
's See id. at 313.
159 See Johnson, supra note 61, at 10 17-2 1.
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D. Procedures to Diminish the Risk of Jury Discrimination Against Defendants
Because of the seeming unfeasibility of direct remedies, the McCleskey Court
turned to preventative measures. The Court argued that procedural protections would
have to suffice to prevent jury discrimination. 6 The Court specifically invoked
several recently announced procedural protections applying equal protection to the
selection of juries, including Batson v. Kentucky, decided the year before. 161
When the McCleskey Court pointed to prophylactic procedural remedies to the
problem of racist juries, it followed a time-honored tradition. For much of the twen-
tieth century, the Supreme Court reviewed appeals of convictions based upon flagrant
racial injustice but rarely acknowledged the underlying problem of racial discrimina-
tion byjuries.'62 Instead, the Court crafted a myriad of constitutional criminal proce-
dure protections to try to solve the problem instrumentally.' 63 It regulated the rules of
the game rather than the fairness of its outcome.
These procedural solutions, governing everything from involuntary confessions
to the right to adequate counsel, attempted to even the odds for minority defendants.
Mere procedure, however, could not overcome the determination of a racist jury.
The Supreme Court twice reversed the infamous rape convictions of the innocent
Scottsboro boys in the 1930s, for example, first for inadequate counsel,"6 then for
160 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309; see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511-12 n.8
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[McCleskey] held that the jury system and the fair-cross-
section principle were designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sentence
based on the race of the victim.").
161 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,85 (1986) (banning
the racial use of peremptory challenges)).
162 See generally Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REv. 359
(2001); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH.
L. REv. 48 (2000). For examples of the Court's superficial treatment of the racial issues at
stake, see the following: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,457 (1966) (referring to the defen-
dants as an "indigent Mexican defendant" and an "indigent Los Angeles Negro"); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936) (noting the trial court's description of the defendants
as "all ignorant negroes" (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (1935) (Griffith, J.,
dissenting))); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932) ("The petitioners.., are negroes
charged with the crime of rape ... of two white girls.").
'63 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968) (referencing risk of racial profiling
in establishing standard of "reasonable" and "articulable" suspicion for a stop and frisk);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (requiring police to warn arrested defendant of the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel); Brown, 297 U.S. at 286 (holding that obtaining evidence
through coercion and brutality violates due process); Powell, 287 U.S. at 58 (expanding right
to counsel).
'6 Powell, 287 U.S. at 58 (finding that defendants received inadequate counsel when every
lawyer in the county was jointly appointed to represent them).
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the exclusion of blacks from the juries.165 After each reversal on procedural grounds,
Alabama juries simply convicted them again. 166
Courts may have no choice about relying on procedure and prevention rather than
regulating the results and the accuracy of jury deliberations. Jury discrimination is
both difficult to prove and to measure. More to the point, judges cannot simply sub-
stitute their own judgments for the decisions ofjuries without violating our constitu-
tional guarantee of jury trials. 167
Yet McCleskey represented an all too rare moment of acknowledgement of the
fallibility of preventative procedures. Generally, the Supreme Court mandates a state
of denial about the black box ofjury deliberations and the possibility of discriminatory
convictions. Established doctrine presumes that jurors follow instructions and that
jurors are colorblind.16 The Court adamantly insists on the myth ofjuror objectivity
despite all of the empirical evidence to the contrary.169 The McCleskey opinion was
not unusual in relying on prophylactic procedural remedies in deference to juries, but
it did represent a rare acknowledgement by the Court that procedures may not suffice.
III. DISCRIMINATORY ACQUITrALS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
Having described the rather hopeless state of the law governing discriminatory
convictions, I now argue for acknowledgement of a new area of constitutional
violation without a clear remedy. Yet recognition of the problem of discriminatory
acquittal is an important step with immediate impact. It shatters certain illusions about
the fallibility of our criminal justice system and about the ways in which we thor-
oughly exclude consideration of victims' rights from the process.
Discriminatory acquittals have gone unnoticed and unremedied in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence for several reasons having nothing to do with their constitution-
ality. Victims lack standing within the criminal justice system to complain directly
165 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596 (1935) (reversing defendant's conviction because
blacks were excluded from the jury).
166 See generally DAN T. CARTER, ScorISBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
(rev. ed. 2007) (recounting the cases of nine African-Americans falsely accused of raping two
Caucasian women on a train, eight of whom were sentenced to death).
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
168 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Nothing would be more pernicious to the jury system than for society to presume that persons
of different backgrounds go to the jury room to voice prejudice."); Rodriguez v. Colorado,
498 U.S. 1055, 1058 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("As a matter of convention, we presume
that jurors follow jury instructions." (citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 454
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
169 See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976) ("In our heterogeneous society
policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a
per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident
of birth, or the choice of religion.").
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of discrimination. 7° Even if victims had a procedural opportunity to challenge dis-
criminatory acquittals, double jeopardy prevents re-prosecution or the appeal of an
acquittal.' 7' While the existence of discriminatory acquittals can be shown in the
abstract by statistical analyses ofjury verdicts collectively, principles ofjury secrecy
make it difficult to root out particular discriminatory acquittals.'72 The days ofjuries
bragging about their racism to the media, as Emmett Till's jury did, have passed.
Yet, as I argue below in Part IV, it remains important to acknowledge the uncon-
stitutionality of discriminatory acquittal. In part, this represents a merely normative
shift, but an important one. Discriminatory acquittals constitute a pervasive constitu-
tional problem. They legitimatize the use of private violence to enforce discrimina-
tion and signal that government resources do not apply to protect all of our citizens.
Recognizing the problem of discriminatory acquittals, and recognizing the problem
as one of constitutional import, would change the norms by which we understand
criminal procedure.
Further, engaging in the analysis necessary to prove the unconstitutionality of
discriminatory acquittals also produces some surprising constitutional insights. Put
aside for a moment all objections about standing and remedy and consider the core
questions: Are jurors bound by the Equal Protection Clause? Are they even state
actors? There are important normative implications to these issues.
I begin by discussing why jury verdicts constitute state action, an important point
rarely discussed by courts or scholars. I then argue that discriminatory acquittals vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. Even if victims have no procedural or substantive
due process rights to a fair verdict, they retain a right against verdicts motivated by
discrimination. Finally, I argue that defendants possess no countervailing right to jury
nullification based upon discriminatory acquittal.
I will not belabor standing issues essentially made moot by the legal and prag-
matic difficulties with creating a remedy for victims of discriminatory acquittal. I
will briefly note, however, that despite the difficulties victims have had in obtaining
standing to challenge government underenforcement of the law generally,'73 in the
170 To have standing, a plaintiffmust show that the challenged conduct caused the plaintiff
actual injury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004).
1 ' Several scholars argue convincingly that double jeopardy does not, and should not,
ban the reversal of an acquittal obtained through fundamental defects in the judicial process,
whether through witness tampering or misconduct by defense counsel. See, e.g., Thomas M.
DiBiagio, Judicial Equity: An Argumentfor Post-Acquittal Retrial When the Judicial Process
Is Fundamentally Defective, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 77, 77-79 (1996). The Supreme Court did
not hold that prosecutive appeal violated double jeopardy until 1896, and then reversed posi-
tions on the subject until finally banning prosecutive appeals and retrials in a closely-divided
opinion. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); see DiBiagio, supra, at 83-84. 1 do not
grapple here with the possibility of reversing course again and allowing prosecutive appeals,
though I believe it is worth considering for the reasons discussed in these articles.
172 See FED. R. EviD. 606(b).
1.. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that a citizen
lacked standing to contest policies of prosecutors if he is neither subject to prosecution nor
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jury selection context, the Supreme Court has proved willing to stretch standing far
more broadly, recognizing the attenuated interests of potential jurors as well as the
interests of the entire community in the public perception ofjustice. 74 In those cases,
the Court brushed away standing concerns with broad declarations about the important
issues at stake: "Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the
idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.""7 5 Thus, if a constitutional
remedy for discriminatory acquittal were available, the precedent exists to recognize
third parties' direct interest in a race-neutral criminal justice process.'76
A. Jury Verdicts Constitute State Action
A constitutional analysis of discriminatory acquittal first requires a determination
of whether jury verdicts constitute state action governed by the Constitution, a ques-
tion that has been the subject of surprisingly little discussion.'77 On one hand, jurors
act with the authority of government, are paid by the government, and enjoy absolute
immunity for their verdicts. 78 Yet, we also characterize jurors as citizens bringing
their independent judgment to a particular case and as private actors subjecting gov-
ernment prosecution to the will of the public. 179 We think of jurors as beyond gov-
ernment control.
The Supreme Court has never decided whether jury verdicts constitute state
action, but it has repeatedly made this point in dicta in the Batson v. Kentucky line
of cases.180 The Court held that the very process of choosing a jury is state action,
threatened with prosecution); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 331, 347
(urging a broader definition of standing for victims, particularly those protecting their equal
protection rights, but noting the "cynical conclusion" that "the only collective interest cog-
nizable is the government's own definition of its own interests, which it buttresses when
necessary by claiming to represent victims or society as a whole").
174 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1992).
17' Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
176 Others have discussed the odd standing issues for a criminal defendant making race-of-
the-victim disparity claims. See generally Carter, supra note 9; Kennedy, supra note 9. 1 seek
a more direct remedy for victims, not a method for defendants to challenge their convictions
or sentences.
177 A few scholars discussing the application of the First Amendment religion clauses to
jury deliberations have briefly theorized that jury deliberations must constitute state action.
See, e.g., Capital Sentencing-Juror Prejudice-Colorado Supreme Court Holds Presence
ofBible in Jury Room Prejudicial, 119 HARv. L. REV. 646, 651 (2005); Terrence T. Egland,
Prejudiced by the Presence of God: Keeping Religious Material Out of Death Penalty
Deliberations, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 337, 356 (2004); Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey,
Knockin' on Heaven's Door: Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86
CoRNELL L. REV. 1090, 1121 (2001).
178 Egland, supra note 177, at 359 (citing Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 626).
"' Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 324 (1996).
180 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (applying Batson to criminal defense
attorneys); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 631 (applying Batson to civil attorneys).
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even when done by private lawyers, because juries are "a quintessential governmental
body-indeed, the institution of government on which ourjudicial system depends."''
The jury system "performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights
of litigants and 'ensur[ing] continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people."" 2
Deciding whether a criminal defendant goes to prison or walks free is the ultimate
government function.8 3
Rather than characterizing jurors as private citizens acting in governance over
the state, the Court has made clear that jurors derive their power from the state:
"The jury exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers the
court's jurisdiction."'' The fact that government delegates power to otherwise pri-
vate citizens does not alter the state action of the work that jurors do. Government
"cannot avoid its constitutional responsibilities by delegating a public function to
private parties."'85 Accordingly, the Court reasoned in dicta, jurors are governed by
the Constitution.
86
Government can be held responsible for the voting of private citizens on juries
in the same way that a law created by direct popular referendum is subject to the
Constitution. 8 7 Jurors exercise enormous power, regardless of whether it is tempo-
rary. Once citizens were sworn in to serve on the Emmett Till jury, they took on the
full force of government authority: the state-granted power to send Till's killers home
or to the electric chair. 88 In a bench trial, there would be no doubt that the judge con-
stitutes a state actor bound by the Equal Protection Clause, not just because the judge
receives a government salary, but because the judge performs a government func-
tion. "'89 Jurors are no different.
l8l McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54.
i82 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).
183 See id.
184 Id.
185 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 53.
186 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 625 (explaining that juries are not "a select, private group beyond
the reach of the Constitution").
187 My state action argument raises the question of whether an individual voting in a gov-
emment election conducts state action, a point raised to me by Laurence Tribe. I agree with him
that voting is state action governed by the Constitution, even if there is no practical ability
to regulate voter motive. It might make a slight impact on voter behavior, moreover, if voters
thought of themselves as bound by the constitutional guarantee of nondiscrimination. We might
ask them to swear an oath to that effect before they voted.
188 See supra note 1.
189 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 468-70 (5th Cir. 1976) (vacating a con-
viction due to the judge's racial bias after it was revealed that before trial, the judge had told
an attorney "that he was going to get that nigger"). One could make an argument that jurors
are merely fact-finders and thus different from a judge in a bench trial. Jurors do not simply
make findings of fact, however; they also apply the law to facts. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 423 (1985) ("[T]he quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find
the facts." (emphasis added)). Further, jury fact-finding is still an important governmental
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B. Discriminatory Acquittals Violate the Equal Protection Clause
When ajury acquits a defendant based on race or gender discrimination against
a victim, the jury violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law.
Equal protection doctrine subjects most race-based government decision-making to
strict scrutiny. "9 The discriminatory enforcement of seemingly neutral statutes also
violates the Constitution."' Legislatures cannot pass facially neutral laws for the
purpose of imposing a "disparate impact" on minorities.'92 Government actors may
not hire or fire employees based on race or gender, even for purposes of affirmative
action, without meeting strict scrutiny.'93
The Supreme Court has been particularly adamant that race discrimination has
no place in criminal trials: "Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects,
is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.""' Even decision-making
within the criminal justice system that is highly discretionary and which receives great
deference may not be based upon race. Discrimination may not influence the decision
to prosecute a case, 195 nor may attorneys choosing a jury consider the race or gender
of a potentialjuror 96 While the Court has been far more sanguine about allowing the
police to use race when deciding whom to stop and frisk on the street, 97 the Court
has closely guarded against the use of race by prosecutors and within the courthouse,
declaring the Court's own arena to be particularly sacrosanct:' "[T]he injury caused
by the discrimination is made more severe because the government permits it to occur
function. Jury verdicts constitute enforceable government action, not simply a non-binding
recommendation to a judge who ultimately makes the decision.
"0o Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race."
(internal citations omitted)); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding
that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
'9' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
192 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,246 (1976) (requiring proofofboth disparate impact
and discriminatory purpose before subjecting a facially neutral statute to strict scrutiny).
'13 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny
to a government affirmative action program which selected contractors).
94 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).
15 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
196 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
197 The Court has punted at least in part on the subject of discriminatory overenforcement
of the law, holding only that race may not serve as the sole reason for a Terry stop and frisk.
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 n. 16 (1976). Scholars have roundly
criticized the Court for failing to consider how extraordinarily discordant this footnote is with
the rest of equal protection law. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects:
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 976-78 (1999).
'98 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,628 (1991). The delegation ofstate
power means that a private body "will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race neu-
trality." Id. at 625.
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within the courthouse itself. Few places are a more real expression of the constitu-
tional authority of the government than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds...
[and where] juries render verdicts.... '" Thus, the Supreme Court has declared
criminal trials to be particularly subject to equal protection regulation.
McCleskey v. Kemp itself arguably stands for the proposition that the Equal
Protection Clause directly governs jury deliberations and discrimination based on
the race of victims.2 Although the Court did not engage in overt discussion of the
application of equal protection to juries, it seemed to presume that a defendant who
could show actual discrimination by his jury based on the race of the victim would
be entitled to redress. As Justice Brennan made more clear in his dissent, for a jury
to punish the murder of a black victim less severely "reflects a devaluation of the lives
,,211of black persons.
While the Court analyzes gender under a reduced level of equal protection scru-
tiny,21 2 the Court consistently strikes down gender classifications based upon "archaic
and overbroad" generalizations about gender," 3 much less those based upon invidious
discrimination. 20' The Court has proved just as willing to ban gender discrimination
in jury selection as it has with race. °5 In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court expanded the
Batson rule to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges. 6 While recognizing
certain differences between race and gender, the Court expressly rejected Alabama's
contention that "gender discrimination, unlike racial discrimination, is tolerable in the
courtroom,"2 7 holding instead that such stereotypes would cause a loss of confidence
in the fairness of our judicial system.208 The Court reasoned that "with respect to jury
service, African-Americans and women share a history of total exclusion, a history
which came to an end for women many years after the embarrassing chapter in our his-
tory came to an end for African-Americans. ' '209 While the Court makes only loose
199 Id. at 628.
200 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
20 Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202 E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to
gender classifications).
203 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 508 (1975)).
204 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (stating that gender classifi-
cations may not be used to perpetuate the subordination of women).
205 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down an automatic exemp-
tion ofwomen fromjury service); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (holding that
women may not be excluded from federal venires where women were eligible for jury service
under local law).
206 511 U.S. 127, 128-29(1994). BeforeJ.E.B., however, the majority opinion in McCleskey
used the possibility that jury discrimination rulings might someday apply to gender as a slippery
slope argument. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 281.
207 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135.
200 Id. at 140.
209 Id. at 136.
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connections between the rights of citizens to participate on juries and the rights of the
parties to litigation to be free from discrimination,2 0 it is hard to imagine the Court
permitting a jury either to convict a defendant based on her gender, or to acquit a
defendant based on the gender of the victim.
C. Equal Protection Analysis Does Not Require Fundamental Rights
The analogy between the unconstitutionality of discriminatory conviction and
discriminatory acquittal is not complete: there are important distinctions between the
rights of victims and defendants within a criminal trial. Courts that have held dis-
criminatory convictions to be unconstitutional have mentioned the Equal Protection
Clause but have relied more heavily on the defendant's due process rights and Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.2" Victims, however, do not have any claim
based on those procedural rights.2 12 Nor do victims have any substantive right to con-
viction of guilty defendants. On the contrary, our system requires acquittal of guilty
defendants for all sorts of instrumental reasons, including the exclusionary rule or
the failure of the government to prove its case to the highest standards of proof.
21 3
Equal protection law, however, does not require the enforcement of a procedural
or substantive right. Government may refuse to perform its duties for a variety of dis-
cretionary and arbitrary reasons, with the express exception of race and gender dis-
crimination.214 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
for example, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that substantive due process should
require government to protect children from violence, but made clear that the "State
may not.., selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities
without violating the Equal Protection Clause."2 5 For the same reasons, while the
20 See Muller, supra note 144, at 101-02 (arguing that the Supreme Court pretends that
the racial and gender composition ofjuries has no effect on jury verdicts, and that to assume
otherwise would violate the Constitution). See generally Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned
Shaw, 49 Loy. L. REv. 133 (2003) (same).
2. See supra notes 121-23. McCleskey also considered the defendant's Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause. 481 U.S.
at 297-99.
22 I argue below in Part III.D that the Sixth Amendment should provide some base-level
protection for the public generally, including victims. The Sixth Amendment right to an
"impartial jury" belongs by its text to the defendant, however, and it would prove difficult
for a particular victim to invoke directly. Yet, it does provide a basic procedural rubric
designed to protect fundamental justice for everyone in the courtroom.
213 See Givelber, Lost Innocence, supra note 74, at 1188-98 (discussing reasons for
acquittals).
214 See Natapoff, supra note 9, at 1748-49; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631
(1996); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989);
Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 571 (1991).
215 489 U.S. at 197 n.3 (1989); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (declaring a heightened
constitutional review triggered by either the burdening of a fundamental right or the targeting
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Court gives wide berth to the inherently discretionary decisions made by actors within
the criminal justice system, those actors may not base their decisions on purposeful
discrimination." 6 Indeed, there are originalist arguments for the principle that the
Equal Protection Clause was intended to "protect" from the discriminatory under-
enforcement of the law. The specter of lynchings and rampant violence against freed
slaves motivated the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 17
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales pre-
sents an example of the difference between a due process and an equal protection
claim.18 Castle Rock demonstrated the terrible consequences that sometimes result
from police underenforcement of domestic violence law, yet the Supreme Court held
that even a mandatory arrest statute219 did not create an entitlement to enforcement
of a domestic violence protective order because, in part, of the enormous importance
of police discretion.220 Castle Rock all but foreclosed procedural due process fights
of crime victims for police protection, just as DeShaney foreclosed substantive due
process rights.2
of a suspect class); Heyman, supra note 214, at 571 ("[T]he Framers understood protection
to include not only the right to a civil remedy and to protection under the criminal law, but also
the state's responsibility to prevent violence."); Kalyani Robbins, Note, No-Drop Prosecution
of Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REv.
205, 223-30 (1999) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause forbids discriminatory under-
enforcement of the law).
216 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 364 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that courts must guard
against discretionary authority within the criminal justice system becoming discriminatory
authority).
217 Id at 346-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment acted out of concern for the equal protection of freed slaves from private
violence); ROBERT KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985); Pokorak,
supra note 43, at 20-22 (collecting a legislative history); Robin West, Towardan Abolitionist
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94W. VA. L.REv. 111, 129-37 (1991) (making
textual and historical arguments that equal protection means guarantee ofprotection by criminal
law against private violence).
218 545 U.S. 748 (2005). Although there are differences between discriminatory under-
enforcement by police and discriminatory acquittal, I argue in Part I that law enforcement's
failures are often motivated by an eye towards what can result in convictions.
219 Like many states, Colorado passed a "mandatory arrest" statute to overcome the famous
reluctance of the police to act against gender-based violence. Id at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
These statutes became a national trend in the 1990s. See id. (citing Emily J. Sack, Battered
Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future ofDomestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS.
L. REv. 1657, 1662-63).
220 Id. at 760.
221 Id. at 753-54. Jessica Gonzales brought a procedural due process claim alleging the
underenforcement ofdomestic violence law by the Castle Rock, Colorado police department.
Despite a statute requiring enforcement of domestic violence protective orders, the police re-
fused her repeated requests to enforce such an order after the kidnapping of her three children
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Nevertheless, as DeShaney established, victims retain a right against under-
enforcement of the law motivated by race or gender discrimination.222 If Jessica
Gonzales could have proved that the Castle Rock Police Department refused to en-
force protective orders because of gender discrimination, she could have brought an
equal protection claim not foreclosed by the Supreme Court's due process rulings.223
Several federal appellate courts have upheld the legal viability of equal protection
claims for underenforcement of domestic violence laws as gender discrimination.224
As a practical matter, proving discrimination is much more difficult than proving
incompetence, but it remains a viable constitutional option.
Clearly, discriminatory acquittals would not create either substantive or proce-
dural due process claims for victims. Victims have neither a property interest in avoid-
ing wrongful acquittal nor an entitlement to a conviction. But while the Constitution
does not require government to perform well, it does require the government not to dis-
criminate. The constitutional claim that discriminatory acquittals violate the Equal
Protection Clause is a very different argument than claiming that victims have a right
to conviction of the guilty. Victims may lack the same rights as defendants to an im-
partial jury or to an accurate verdict, but they retain a right against discrimination.
D. Jury Nullification Cannot Be Based on Unconstitutional Discrimination
The most powerful potential objection to the unconstitutionality of discriminatory
acquittal would posit that defendants have a countervailing constitutional right to an
acquittal for any reason, no matter how silly or illegitimate. As one scholar declared,
by her ex-husband. Later that night, Mr. Gonzales drove the dead bodies of the three girls to
the police station. Id. at 754.
222 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989).
223 See generally Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to
Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990) (analyzing the equal protection and due
process claims of battered women under § 1983 after the Supreme Court held that there was
no general constitutional right to police protection in DeShaney).
224 See, e.g., Estate ofMacias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding
a domestic violence case to consider equal protection claim); Watson v. City of Kansas City,
857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988); Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1027 (3d Cir.
1987). In the 1970s, domestic violence victims brought lawsuits against the police departments
of New York and Oakland, alleging that explicit police policies refusing to enforce domestic
violence laws were motivated by gender discrimination. The police departments settled the
cases. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); CLARE DALTON &
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & THE LAW 594 (2001). In Thurman v. City
ofTorrington, a federal courtjury awarded $2.3 million for the discriminatory underenforce-
ment of domestic violence laws in Torrington, Connecticut. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn.
1984); Albert R. Roberts & Karel Kurst-Swanger, Police Responses to Battered Women: Past,
Present, and Future, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES:
POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND LEGAL REMEDIES 110-11 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002).
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"the criminal jury's power to acquit is sacrosanct and cannot be disturbed., 225 Argu-
ably, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial implies a right to jury nullification,
to an acquittal based on the jury's refusal to follow the law. I argue, however, that
any potential right of jury nullification cannot include a right for a jury to discrim-
inate against victims based on race or gender. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an
"impartial" jury, not a partial one.226
The Supreme Court gives wide berth to the discretion of all of the government
actors within the criminal justice system,227 and juries have a particular constitutional
basis for their independence. The Supreme Court describes "jury lenity" as part "of
the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive
exercises of power by the Executive Branch."22 The defendant's right to ajury trial
serves to "prevent oppression by the [g]overnment" and to protect against the "over-
zealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." '229 Jury
lenity thus implies the right to disobey the law in the interest of mercy and a broader
230
sense of justice.
Most courts refuse to define jury lenity so broadly as to include outright jury nulli-
fication, the refusal of a jury to enforce the law."' The D.C. Circuit has argued that
such verdicts are a "lawless" abuse of power and even unconstitutional, "a denial of
due process." '232 The fact that a jury can nullify with impunity because of double
225 Chris Kemmitt, Function Over Fonn: Reviving the Criminal Jury's HistoricalRole as
a Sentencing Body, 40 MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 116 (2006).
226 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
227 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (referencing deference
that is given in accordance with prosecutorial discretion).
228 United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
229 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
230 Kemmitt, supra note 225, at 117.
231 The Supreme Court's decision in Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), is often
cited as rejecting jury nullification, but it held only that it was not reversible error to refuse
to offer a jury instruction informing the jury of a right or power to nullify. In United States v.
Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308,405-46,450-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), Judge Weinstein authored an
extraordinarily thorough description of the controversy overjury nullification, complete with
a four page appendix of citations, tracing its history from colonial times to the current Supreme
Court case law overturning mandatory sentencing. See also B. Michael Dann, "Must Find
the Defendant Guilty" Jury Instructions Violate the Sixth Amendment, 91 JUDICATURE 12
(2007) ("[A] survey of the states' and federal circuits' corresponding jury instruction lan-
guage reveals that 24, or almost 40 percent, of state courts and federal circuits use the com-
mand 'must' or its equivalent ('shall' or 'duty') to direct juries to verdicts of guilty when all of
the elements of the alleged crime have been proven. Another 7, or 13 percent, use the milder
admonition 'should' to steer the jury's decision to guilt."). Some judges have gone as far as
to tell jurors they have a legal obligation to apply the law, that they could face sanctions upon
nullification, and that they had a duty to notify the court if any juror expressed intent to dis-
regard the law. Id. at 13.
232 United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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jeopardy "does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law."233 Other cir-
cuits also have held that defendants have no right to a jury instruction on the power
to nullify a verdict.3 Scholars urging a right to jury nullification usually contend
that it constitutes a moral, rather than a constitutional, prerogative.3
Regardless of the controversy over jury nullification generally,236 no court or
scholar argues that juries should have the power to decide based upon discrimination
against the victims of crimes. The closest such argument occurred in dicta in
McCleskey v. Kemp, when the Court referred to the ability ofjuries to acquit for any
number of illegitimate reasons without appellate review: "Of course, 'the power to be
lenient [also] is the power to discriminate.' 23 7 The Court treated this as a potential
bonus, the dangling carrot thatjury discretion offers to defendants. The Court's cynical
statement of fact about the "power" to discriminate, however, did not serve as a nor-
mative statement of a defendant's right to the possibility of discriminatory acquittal.
Instead, the statement seems indicative of the odd procedural posture of the case.
McCleskey complained that his jury sentenced him to death because he killed a white
victim instead of a black one.23 The Court's statement implied that McCleskey
should be careful what he asked for; the correct remedy would be stronger sentences
for the killers of black victims rather than leniency for the killers of white victims.
In contrast, the Second Circuit has condemned the practice of jury nullification
precisely because it risks discrimination against victims. 239 In United States v.
233 id.
234 United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant
had no right to his proposed jury nullification charge); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a judge may "block defense attorneys' attempts to
serenade ajury with the siren song of nullification"); United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013,
1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding no error in trial judge's negative response to jury question on
nullification).
235 E.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JuRY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 61 (1994) ("[Flor anyone who takes seriously the jury as a bridge between
community values and the law, jury nullification is a strong plank. In essence, nullification
empowers jurors to appeal to fundamental principles of justice over and above the written
law."); Robert P. Lawry, The Moral Obligation of the Juror to the Law, 112 PENN ST. L.
REv. 137, 158-59 (2007).
236 See generally David Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court Should
Instruct the Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 89, 105 (1995) (urging the
Supreme Court to reconsider Spar). But see Pamela Baschab, Jury Nullification: the Anti-
Atticus, 65 ALA. LAW. 110, 114 (2004) ("Jury nullification, no matter how you slice it, is at
bottom a desecration of the basic premise that we are all equal under the law."); Richard St.
John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies ofAuthorized
Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALEL.J. 2563 (1997) (criticizing legislative proposals to authorize jury
nullification).
237 481 U.S. 279,312 (quoting KENNETH CUl DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)).
238 Id. at 291-92.
239 See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Thomas, a seminal case on jury deliberations, the court distinguished between jury
nullification used to protest government authority, such as the historic refusal to en-
force the Fugitive Slave Act, and jury nullification used for the purpose of discrimina-
tion, citing the acquittals of the killers of Medgar Evers and Emmett Till as "shameful
examples of how nullification has been used to sanction murder and lynching."2 '
Any alleged right to jury lenity cannot extend so far that it invades the province
of delineated constitutional guarantees; it cannot trump the Equal Protection Clause.
While the right to a jury trial might imply a certain amount of personalized justice
and mercy for the killers of Emmett Till, it did not guarantee them the possibility of
ajury nullification based on racism against Till. The jury's discriminatory acquittal
violated Till's Equal Protection Clause rights, and it also violated the Supreme Court's
oft-expressed commitment to remove racial discrimination of any kind from crimi-
nal trials.24'
Further, the Constitution speaks directly to the issue of whether defendants have
a right to a discriminatory jury nullification when it guarantees defendants only a right
to an "impartial jury," not to a partial one.242 Impartiality represents a fixed point,
bending neither towards the defendant nor away from him.
Textually, the Sixth Amendment right applies only to the defendant, and, it could
be argued, does not guarantee impartiality for the victim. Yet, the Supreme Court has
described the right more broadly as protecting the public as a whole: "Although the
constitutional guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the State, the goal it ex-
presses is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants: neither the defendant nor
the State should be favored."243 The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only impartiality
240 Id. at 616 ("Moreover, although the early history ofour country includes the occasional
Zenger trial or acquittals in fugitive slave cases, more recent history presents numerous and
notorious examples ofjurors nullifying-cases that reveal the destructive potential of a prac-
tice Professor Randall Kennedy of the Harvard Law School has rightly termed a 'sabotage
of justice."' (quoting Randall Kennedy, The Angry Juror, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1994, at
A12)). A California state court has cited Thomas with approval for this point. People v.
Williams, 25 Cal. 4th 441,459 (Cal. 2001) ("[I]t is important not to encourage or glorify the
jury's power to disregard the law. While that power has, on some occasions, achieved just
results, it also has led to verdicts based upon bigotry and racism. A jury that disregards the
law and, instead, reaches a verdict based upon the personal views and beliefs of the jurors
violates one of our nation's most basic precepts: that we are 'a government of laws and not
men."' (internal citations omitted)). Ultimately, however, the court in Thomas despaired of a
trial judge's pragmatic ability to prove the difference between a juror who refuses to deliberate
for legitimate versus illegitimate reasons. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616. But see United States v.
Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308,433-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (criticizing Thomas as unduly restricting
Sixth Amendment rights to jury lenity).
241 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,56 (1992) (applying the Equal Protection Clause
to the exercise ofperemptory challenges by defense lawyers because it threatens the public's
perception of the validity and neutrality of the criminal justice system).
242 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
243 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990).
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for the defendant, "but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between
him and the state the scales are to be evenly held."2" The Sixth Amendment does
not simply protect the rights of the accused, it strives for accuracy of verdicts.245
No scholars supportive of the right ofjury nullification have defended discrimi-
natory acquittal,246 but at least one has argued for the permissibility ofjury nullifica-
tion based on racial solidarity with the defendant. Paul Butler argues that juries have
a right to use nullification to correct the racial overenforcement of the law.247 As a
prosecutor in Washington, D.C., he watched majority-minority juries acquit black
defendants in order to prevent "send[ing] yet another black man to jail," and he argues
that those juries acted within their moral, if not legal, authority.248
Butler does not attempt to invoke a constitutional right to jury nullification in his
analysis. More to the point, he also carefully excludes trials of crimes with victims,
recognizing that crime victims have countervailing rights and interests.2 9 There is
a difference between racial or gender solidarity with the defendant and discrimina-
tory acquittals.
For example, when representing O.J. Simpson, Johnny Cochran arguably appealed
for jury nullification based on racial solidarity and outrage at the racism of the Los
Angeles Police Department. It would have been different had Cochran appealed
to jurors to disregard the murder of Nicole Simpson because she was friendly with
another man and thus deserved her fate. The first example arguably falls within the
traditional definition of jury lenity as a bulwark against overweening government
authority and thus falls within the existing controversy over the permissibility of
24 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,220 (1965) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68,
70(1887)).
245 For example, in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when deciding the constitu-
tionally required size of a jury, the Court cited the Sixth Amendment as balancing the odds
against a jury's conviction of the innocent versus the risk that ajury would acquit the guilty.
Thus "an optimal jury size can be selected as a function of the interaction between the two
risks." Id. at 234.
246 One scholar lists the possibility ofdiscrimination against victims by race as a "potential
harm" ofjury nullification. Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 877, 935 (1999) (describing the difficulties of distinguishing between legitimate acquittal
and nullification).
247 Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 705-06 (1995). Butler explicitly excludes violent crimes with
victims from his analysis, recognizing that acquitting such defendants would create too great
a cost. See id. at 719-20. But cf. Long X. Do, Jury Nullification and Race-Conscious
Reasonable Doubt: Overlapping Reifications of Commonsense Justice and the Potential Voir
Dire Mistake, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1843 (2000) (reviewing criticism of Butler for undermining
race-free justice).
248 Butler, supra note 247, at 679.
249 Id. at 719.
250 Walter L. Hixson, Black and White: The O.J Simpson Case, in RACE ON TRIAL: LAW
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 228-29 (Annette Gordon-Reed ed., 2002).
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outright nullification. The second example would describe discriminatory acquittal,
the unconstitutional discrimination against the victim because of her failure to meet
gender roles. A jury has no more right to acquit O.J. Simpson in order to permit
gender-based violence than it would have a right to convict him because of his race.
The constitutional right ofjury lenity is rooted in an expanded definition ofjus-
tice, the recognition that justice in the particular case may require mercy.25" ' Any argu-
able right to jury nullification, therefore, does not include a right to discriminatory
acquittal. The Constitution defines race and gender discrimination as manifestly un-
just, and requires an "impartial jury." Discriminatory acquittals effect, rather than
check, government oppression.
E. Impossibility of Direct Remedy
I do not propose the type of fundamental reordering of our system necessary
to provide a direct remedy for discriminatory acquittal, in large part because such
remedies accomplish so little to remedy discriminatory convictions. Despite the em-
pirical evidence that discriminatory acquittal is a serious systemic problem, it would
seem an impossible task for a judge to find evidence of jury discrimination in an
individual case, for all of the reasons the Supreme Court named in McCleskey.252
Judges would have to sift out acquittals based upon discrimination from acquittals
based on a host of legitimate grounds, and would have far less room for error. The
Second Circuit in United States v. Thomas despaired of the ability to tell the difference
and still protect the defendant's rights to a legitimate acquittal, particularly because
the evidence relevant to such hard distinctions lies hidden beneath the veil of jury
secrecy.2 3 While there are legitimate arguments for creating an exception to double
251 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The criminal code of every
country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in
favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel."); see
also Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent ofthe Administrative State andtheDemise of Mercy, 121
HARv. L. REv. 1332, 1360 (2008) ("Both nullification and clemency allow individualization,
which becomes increasingly important as judges lose authority to tailor sentences."); George
Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The
Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 212, 212 (noting, with
respect to presidential grants, "the importance of having a safety valve in any system of
mandatory punishments").
252 481 U.S. 279, 314-19 (1987).
253 116 F.3d 606, 616 (1997). Thomas addressed the rare situation in which potential dis-
crimination becomes known during jury deliberations, before an acquittal protected by double
jeopardy. The Second Circuit discussed the inherent difficulties of intervening during jury
deliberations and distinguishing between a juror who wants to acquit the defendant for legit-
imate reasons versus illegitimate. Because a defendant deserves every benefit of the doubt, the
Second Circuit in Thomas created a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard before removing
ajuror for nondeliberation. See also Marder, supra note 246, at 885-87 (describing the diffi-
culties of distinguishing between legitimate acquittal and nullification).
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jeopardy for discriminatory acquittals,2M for now, the pragmatic difficulties with such
a remedy make the instrumental approaches suggested below more important.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING DISCRIMINATORY ACQUITTAL AND
INSTRUMENTAL APPROACHES
Constitutional violations frequently lack viable direct remedies, yet we acknowl-
edge them for other reasons. Understanding the ways our government falls short of
constitutional guarantees informs our legal norms.2 5 It alters the way we perceive the
limits of our system, and it creates an impetus to seek other methods to avoid the prob-
lem at issue. Acknowledging the problem of discriminatory convictions, for example,
has not magically created direct solutions to the problem ofjury discrimination against
defendants, but it has created an awareness of the issue that underlies other reforms:
a new hesitation about the viability of the death penalty in the face ofjury discrimi-
nation256 and an understanding that criminal procedure must do what it can to guard
against jury discrimination.257
Similarly, acknowledging discriminatory acquittals would result in some im-
portant paradigm shifts. First, it would prevent us from using juries as excuses for
254 There is an exception to double jeopardy after the bribery of ajury which could arguably
be extended to discriminatory acquittals. If a defendant was never really injeopardy because
he bribed the jury, he has forfeited his rights against double jeopardy. See People v. Aleman,
667 N.E.2d 615(1996); cf David S. Rudstein, DoubleJeopardy and the Fraudulently-Obtained
Acquittal, 60 Mo. L. REV. 607 (1995) (arguing that double jeopardy should forbid retrials
even for acquittals obtained through fraud). One might argue that the killers of Emmett Till
were never really in jeopardy from a racist jury determined to acquit, and that an exception
to the double jeopardy protection should apply. Unlike bribery, however, the defendant does
not necessarily induce a jury to discriminate against the victim. A defendant cannot forfeit
his double jeopardy rights unless he causes the error. See, e.g., id. at 641. After the Rodney
King acquittal, Akhil Amar made the analogy to bribery and proposed such an exception. Akhil
Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLuM. L.
REV. 1 (1995). Amar recognized the forfeiture issue and would limit a due process exception
to trials in which the defendant commits Batson error in choosing a jury. Amar did not ground
this proposal in any notion of victim's equal protection rights, however, but rather in the
potential juror's rights and in general Sixth Amendment interests in an impartial jury. Further,
this argument would be difficult to make because Batson itself did not presume that the makeup
of the jury necessarily led to jury discrimination. In fact the Batson line of cases declared such
assumptions to be unconstitutional. Muller, supra note 144, at 101.
255 See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword. Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983) (discussing the interplay between law and legal
norms).
256 See TRISHA KENDALL, EQUAL JUSTICE USA/QuixoTE CENTER, LEGISLATION PROGRESS
(BY STATE) (2000), http://www.ejusa.org/archives/updates/legis2000.html (providing a sum-
mary of death penalty activity in each state at that time, including moratoria established by
several governors).
257 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309.
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otherwise unconstitutional behavior. No longer could police and prosecutors point
to the likelihood of a discriminatory acquittal as a legitimizing scapegoat for the re-
fusal to protect a disfavored victim. Second, it would make available a new constitu-
tional vocabulary for judges and prosecutors to protect the rights of victims against
jury discrimination. The procedural rights we grant defendants to try to prevent dis-
criminatory convictions should also apply to protect victims.
A. Using Discriminatory Acquittal as an Excuse for Discriminatory
Underenforcement
Discriminatory acquittals are but a subset of the greater problem of discriminatory
underenforcement of the law, but they are at its core; they are its excuse. As described
in Part I, police and prosecutorial decisions are made with an eye towards anticipated
jury bias.258 While law enforcement sometimes engages in its own unconstitutional
bias against certain victims,219 such bias is at least recognized as impermissible.26
What is treated as legitimate, however, is the use of probable discrimination ofjuries
as an excuse. Police and prosecutors are unlikely to tell a rape victim that they them-
selves do not care about gender-based violence. What they would, and do, say is that
the jury is unlikely to convict the rapist because the victim did something that violated
acceptable gender norms.26 ' Empirical studies make clear that arrest and prosecutive
decisions are justified by the likelihood of discriminatory acquittal.2 2 It makes sense
258 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
259 See Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private andPublic Trouble: Prosecutors and the
Allocation of Court Resources, 26 Soc. PROBs. 439, 446 (1979) (describing study showing
prosecutive bias based on race of the victim). See generally LAFREE, supra note 83.
260 See generally Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning theAutonomy ofProsecutorial
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing There Will Be
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000) (describing constitutional
ban on exercising prosecutorial discretion based on the race of the victim).
261 See Estrich, supra note 95, at 1087-89 (describing the experience of being a "good"
rape victim because she did not know her attacker and because he carried a weapon). I re-
cently experienced this while assisting a student seeking prosecution ofher rapist. The police
detective informed me that the student's delay in reporting the rape, despite her reasonable
explanation for the delay, made the case unwinnable, so the detective refused to seek an arrest
warrant. The detective complained to me generally about date rape victims and how angry she
got at them for not reacting with sufficiently immediate signs of fear and rage, thus making
it too difficult to get a conviction from a jury. She found their cases "annoying." Once the
detective was finally convinced, the prosecutor refused the case for the same reasons. Neither
seemed to doubt that the student was raped, but both seemed quite angry that she behaved
in a way inconsistent with what juries expect of female rape victims. They were unwilling
to try to reeducate ajury. The fact that ajury would blame or disbelieve the rape victim (in
ways described above in Part I as gendered) was treated as an entirely sufficient explanation
for their refusals to arrest and prosecute.
262 See Pokorak, supra note 43, at 39-40 (discussing prosecutorial race-of-victim charging
disparities in rape cases in anticipation ofjury discrimination).
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that law enforcement would hesitate to invest resources and reputation in cases in
which juries are unlikely to convict.2 63
Yet in cases in which the government refuses to enforce the law because of the
possibility ofjury discrimination, government anticipates, and thus magnifies, a con-
stitutional violation. Recognizing discriminatory acquittal as unconstitutional would
remove jury discrimination as a legitimizing basis for anticipatory discrimination
against certain crime victims. Police and prosecutors would receive the message that
the Constitution requires them to enforce the law despite the possibility ofjury dis-
crimination against victims. As an example of this paradigm shift, during the mid-
twentieth century, the possibility ofjury discrimination stopped serving as an excuse
for refusing to arrest or prosecute the killers of civil rights leaders. Instead, law en-
forcement understood that it had an obligation to work harder for convictions, not to
anticipate the discrimination and drop the case. 64 Acknowledging the modem version
of discriminatory acquittal should create a similar paradigm shift. Police and prose-
cutors should understand that they may not refuse to charge a crime because of antici-
pated jury discrimination, any more than they could refuse to bring charges because
of their own discrimination against the victim.
Moreover, prosecutors should have an affirmative obligation to work harder to
counter jury discrimination during trials.265 In order to counter a racial lack of em-
pathy, prosecutors should spend more effort and resources convincing juries of the
value and humanity of minority victims. Prosecutors who shy away from prosecuting
complicated gender-based violence cases should try to reeducate juries with expert
witness testimony on "normal" behavior by rape or domestic violence victims. 266
Regardless of whether these techniques succeed, at a minimum, bringing cases
to trial reveals the true extent of discriminatory acquittal instead of anticipating and
263 See Kenneth Bresler, "I NeverLost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 543-44 (1996); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is
Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping
Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 283, 289-92 (2001).
264 See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 65-68 (describing efforts, particularly by the Justice
Department, to prosecute racial violence not charged by local officials); supra text accom-
panying notes 32-39.
265 By this I do not mean an enforceable obligation mandating skillful trial techniques, but
rather an ethical obligation informed by constitutional norms. See Angela Davis, Prosecution
andRace: The Power andPrivilege ofDiscretion, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 13, 52 (1998) (describ-
ing police and prosecutors' ethical and constitutional obligations to guard against discrimi-
nation against victims in their arrest and charging decisions).
266 See generally Bonnie J. Buchele & James P. Buchele, Legal and Psychological Issues
in the Use of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 26 (1985);
Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of
Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 101 (1988). I do not pre-
tend that such steps are obvious and easy, or that they will necessarily work. But the decision
not even to attempt to undo the potential discrimination of ajury transforms the possibility of
unequal protection of the law into an absolute certainty.
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thus masking it.267 It was not until law enforcement finally began arresting and prose-
cuting lynchers and the killers of civil rights leaders with any frequency that the extent
of discrimination against minority victims became clear to the public.26 Even though
such prosecutions usually resulted in predictable acquittals, they were a necessary step
towards justice. They publicly revealed the fact that African-Americans still did not
share in equal protection of criminal laws, and the verdicts served as an oft-cited part
of the roiling national debate on race.269
Acknowledging discriminatory acquittal, and removing it as an excuse for dis-
criminatory underenforcement of the law, should bring new attention to the unequal
protection of the law. In our constitutional and policy conversations about civil rights
and equality, we focus on the residual effects of segregation, overt governmental dis-
crimination, and the injustice of discriminatory convictions, but we miss the enor-
mous and ongoing problem of discriminatory underenforcement of criminal laws.270
We usually fail to connect the failure to convict those who rape women, who beat their
wives, or who do violence to black victims with the disproportionate rates of violence
against those groups.27" ' We fail to acknowledge the ways that victims lose freedom
not just because of overt government discrimination, but because they know that
crimes against them are far less likely to be punished.
International law offers a concrete example of the paradigm shift created by
acknowledging discriminatory underenforcement. In contrast to American constitu-
tional law, international human rights law explicitly decrees that the discriminatory
underenforcement of the law is an impermissible abuse of government power.272 It
makes clear that governments may not permit the murder, rape, or torture of distinct
267 Others have urged this kind ofdisclosure as to prosecutors and police. See, e.g., Davis,
supra note 265, at 54-56 (urging the keeping of statistics to reveal racial bias in prosecutive
decisions).
268 See CHADBOURN, supra note 46 (discussing failure to arrest, prosecute, and then convict
lynchers); supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
269 See generally ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 47.
270 See Kennedy, Comment, supra note 21, at 1256 (discussing public failure to acknowledge
the costs of unequal protection of the law); Natapoff, supra note 9, at 1716-17 (2006) (noting
that underenforcement of the law, as a general problem, is rarely addressed by scholars).
271 There is far more recognition of this issue in the context of gender than of race. The
congressional and scholarly debate over the Violence Against Women Act, for example, and
the conception of gender-based violence as a civil right helped to raise the profile of under-
enforcement of the law as to gender crimes. Scholars certainly focus on the underenforcement
of gender-based violence generally. See Estrich, supra note 95, at 1161. There is some public
discussion of unequal protection of the law in the increasingly rare circumstance of the acquittal
of an alleged hate crime or racially motivated killing. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 9, at 420-29
(analyzing the acquittal of Bernard Goetz for the subway shooting of young black men, purport-
edly in self-defense). Yet, underenforcement of the law remains a rare topic of discussion.
272 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 5, Dec. 16, 1966,
3 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-cescr.htm.
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minorities or women either to punish them or because of a lack of concern for them.273
A series of Conventions and U.N. Declarations provide examples from all over the
world of discriminatory government complicity in "private" violence against partic-
ular groups: hate crimes, the private violence underlying apartheid, segregation, dowry
murders, and honor killings.274 In the context of gender, the U.N. has declared lax
enforcement of domestic violence laws to be a violation of international human rights
because such underenforcement has the cause and effect of subjugating women.275
In the context of race, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination guarantees "the right to security of person and protection by the State
against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any
individual group or institution. 2 76 Government complicity in private violence violates
human rights.
International law thus fleshes out the stated principle of American constitutional
law that equality rights prohibit the selective enforcement of criminal law. It establishes
273 Id.; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 2(e), Sept. 3, 1981,34 U.N.T.S. 193, available athttp://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter Convention on Elimination ofDiscrimination];
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(b),
Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/dlcerd
.htm [hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination]; United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19, Violence
Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/3 8 (11 th Session, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm [hereinafter General Recommendation
on Discrimination Against Women]. Arguably, government acquiescence in violence against
women also violates international customary law against torture. See Rhonda Copelon,
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLuM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 291, 295 (1994).
274 See Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 273; Convention on Elimination
of Discrimination, supra note 273; Radhika Coomaraswamy, Combating Domestic Violence:
Obligations of the State, 6 INNOCENTI DIG. 10, 10 (2000).
275 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) not
only requires states to refrain from committing violations themselves, but also makes them
responsible for otherwise "private" acts if they fail to fulfill their duty to prevent and punish
such acts. See General Recommendation on Discrimination Against Women, supra note 273.
(The United States stands almost alone in not ratifying CEDAW.) The Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women decries the "long-standing failure to protect and pro-
mote [women's] rights and freedoms in the case of violence against women," and makes clear
that "violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms
of women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms." United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination ofViolence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/
a48r104.htm; Coomaraswamy, supra note 274, at 10. Domestic violence also falls within
prohibitions on torture. See Michele E. Beasley & Dorothy Q. Thomas, Domestic Violence
as a Human Rights Issue, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY
OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 323 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
276 Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 273, at art. 5(b).
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discriminatory underenforcement as violating basic human rights. It acknowledges
that minorities and women all over the world often suffer more at the hands of legiti-
mized private violence than from direct government abuse. In the United States, we
lack such language because of our own constitutional focus on state action rather than
purposeful omission and because our criminal justice system excludes victims in its
bilateral balancing between the defendant and the state.277
B. Remembering the Victim in Equal Protection Regulation of Criminal Trials
Acknowledging discriminatory acquittals would also change the norms of crim-
inal procedure. In our current adversarial, bilateral understanding of criminal justice,
we focus entirely on the state and the defendant. We ignore victims almost entirely
and treat juries as unknowable black boxes, seemingly beyond the authority of the
Constitution. A doctrine of discriminatory acquittal situates the rights and obligations
of these invisible others. It requires acknowledgment of the state action of juries and
of the equal protection rights of victims.27
Currently, victims possess only limited statutory, and in some states constitutional,
procedural rights to participate in the outer edges of the criminal process.279 Victims
may quietly observe criminal trials, but they generally have rights to speak only in
bond hearings or sentencing."' While the more inquisitorial criminal justice systems
in civil law countries often allow victims direct participation in criminal trials (from
277 I argue that jury verdicts, whether convictions or acquittals, constitute state action
rather than omission, and regardless, are governed by the Equal Protection Clause. See supra
Parts III.B and III.C.
278 See supra Parts III.A and III.B.
279 See 18 U.S.C. § 377 1(a)(2)-(8) (guaranteeing victims rights to notice and presence at
all proceedings, to be heard at sentencing, to confer with the prosecutor, to restitution as pro-
vided for in law, rights against unreasonable delay, and "[tihe right to be treated with fairness
and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy"). Thirty-three states now have victims'
rights amendments, and every state and the federal government have victims' rights statutes
with varying provisions. See Hon. Jon Kyl et. al., On the Wings of Their Angels, 9 LEwis &
CLARK L. REv. 581, 588 n.30 (2005) (listing state victims' rights amendments and statutes).
Congress has even considered a victims' rights amendment to the Constitution similar to the
federal statute. The Victims' Bill of Rights Constitutional Amendment was originally intro-
duced as S.J. Res. 52 and H.J. Res. 174 on April 22, 1996 by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). See ChiefJustice Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The
Proposed Crime Victims 'Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper
Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 5 n. 11(1997). After the amendment failed in the 104th
Congress, it was reintroduced in the 105th as S.J. 6, but failed again. See Victoria Schwartz,
The Victims'Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 528-29 (2005). None of these,
however, offer victims direct procedural participation in criminal trials or substantive consti-
tutional rights to equal protection.
280 See Kyl, supra note 279, 581-91 (describing limits of victim's rights protections).
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questioning witnesses to making closing arguments),28 1 such direct victim partici-
pation would not easily fit within our adversarial criminal justice system.282
28 Civilian systems often allow victims and their attorneys to stand beside prosecutors and
defense lawyers, to question witnesses and to give closing arguments. See Christine Van Den
Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17-18
(Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993); R.L. Jones, Victims of Crime in France, 158 JUST.
PEACE & LOC. Gov'T L., 795,795-96 (1994); Rende Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two
Systems: An American on Trialfor an American Murder in the French Cour d'Assises, 2001
U. ILL. L. REv. 791, 819-22; William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German
Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37,
54-55 (1996) (explaining that Germany allows victim participation in cases very personal
to victims or their families); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties ofBuilding an Adversarial Trial System on a CivilLaw
Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1992) (stating that in Italy, injured persons are entitled
to participate as parties to criminal case from pretrial to appeal). Interestingly, a few American
states still allow victims to retain counsel to represent their interests alongside the public
prosecutor for minor crimes. See Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866 (R.I. 2001)
(upholding assault victim's right to initiate a private complaint and prosecute defendant for
misdemeanor assault); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of
Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REv. 511, 529 (1994).
282 We might consider allowing victims to participate directly in criminal trials, not just on
the periphery, in order to prevent discriminatory acquittals. Victims and their counsel might
prove more effective at directly rebutting the discrimination that leads to jury nullification.
The direct presence of victims in the proceedings could give voice to the voiceless, and remind
juries to contemplate the rights of victims to equal protection of the law. See William T. Pizzi,
Victims 'Rights: Rethinking Our "Adversary System ", 1999 UTAH L. REv. 349,355 (arguing
that victims of gender-based violence might be more effective at directly rebutting sex dis-
crimination). In our adversarial notion of criminal justice, however, it is very difficult for us
to imagine expanding victims' rights beyond the usual unenforced, tepid statutory require-
ments of notice and allocution. In contrast, civil systems are inquisitorial, more focused on
seeking out the truth than on balancing adversarial rights to participate in the system. Pizzi &
Marafioti, supra note 281, at 7. Including victims directly in our own process would require
fundamental transformation of our adversarial criminal justice system, a system embedded
in our Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence. We would have difficulty situating a third
party in the delicate balance between government and criminal defendant. See Rachel King,
Why a Victims 'Rights ConstitutionalAmendment Is a BadIdea: Practical Experiences from
Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 357, 370-98 (2000) (describing practical and ethical diffi-
culties of incorporating direct victim participation into our adversarial system); Walker A.
Matthews, III, Note, Proposed Victims'Rights Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the
Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735 (1998) (same). We exclude individual vic-
tims from the process in part to prevent a notion of retribution by any particular victim. See
Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he use of private prosecutors
who are also representing plaintiffs in civil actions against the criminal defendant should be
discouraged."); Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973,977 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e note our concern
about the practice of using a private attorney. . . ."); New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp.
747 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding a conflict of interest for private citizen pursuant to state rule to
initiate and prosecute assault charges).
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It is not necessary to include victims directly in criminal trials, however, in order
to include their interests within criminal procedure. We should vest responsibility for
the protection of the equal protection rights of victims with the government, to de-
fine a prosecutor's ethical role to do justice broadly enough to encompass the equal
protection rights of victims against discriminatory acquittal.283 Prosecutors do not
"represent" individual victims as if they were clients; nor should they.2  Yet the
protection of basic tenets ofjustice should require prosecutors to guard against jury
discrimination against minorities and women, and to represent the equal protection
rights of victims far more collectively.
This would create a fundamental norm change in current criminal procedure.
At the moment, neither the prosecutor nor the judge has any available constitutional
language to describe or protect the equal protection rights of victims. Instead, prose-
cutors invoke, and judges can enforce, a general sense of fairness, the rules of rele-
vance, and the reputation of the criminal justice system.285 These doctrines are highly
discretionary and lack the constitutional and persuasive impetus of an overt attempt
to provide equal protection rights to victims.
As an example of the difference, in Georgia v. McCollum, the Court missed a
perfect opportunity to extend the equal protection rights of victims to race-neutral
justice.286 McCollum involved the prosecution of an alleged hate crime by white
283 See Davis, supra note 265, at 50-53 (arguing that prosecutors have an ethical obli-
gation to provide equal protection of the law to victims by correcting the discrimination of
the police and by refraining from discriminating themselves).
2 4 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (2004) (Prosecutors must "seek
justice."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate."); ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2(c) (1993) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice,
not merely to convict."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.2 cmt. at 53
(1993) ("[T]he prosecutor's client is not the victim but the people who live in the prosecutor's
jurisdiction."); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[A prosecutor] is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obliga-
tion to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.... He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one."); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court,
891 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] prosecutor does not 'represent' the victim in
a criminal trial; therefore, the victim is not a 'client' of the prosecutor."); Carol A. Corrigan,
On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537,537 (1986) ("The prosecutor does not
represent the victim of a crime, the police, or any individual. Instead, the prosecutor represents
society as a whole.").
285 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (holding that a state has a right to
protect "the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process").
286 See id.
[Vol. 18:75
DISCRIMINATORY ACQUIMAL
defendants against black victims. 287 During jury selection, McCollum's lawyer argued
that he had an absolute right to use peremptory challenges to strike every black person
off of the jury, because the constitutional prohibition announced in Batson v. Kentucky
applied only to the state.28" The Supreme Court disagreed, applying Batson for the
first time to the defense. Instead of addressing the rights of the African-American
victims of the hate crime, however, the Court rested on far more attenuated interests.
The Court found potential injury to jurors who were stereotyped, and injury to the
reputation for fairness in the process.289
The Court did not acknowledge the rights of the African-American victims to a
fair trial. Ironically, however, it did express concern about the possibility of riots after
an acquittal by an all-white jury.290 The Court cited such riots in Miami and opined
that public confidence in race-neutral trials is "essential for preserving community
peace in trials involving race-related crimes.""2 9 Thus the Court worried more about
public outcry than about the rights of victims to race-neutral justice, and more about
the perception of justice than its substance.
At least in McCollum, the Supreme Court provided equal protection enforcement
rights to prosecutors, albeit for the wrong reasons.2 92 For the most part, however, the
procedural protections that we offer defendants to protect against discriminatory
convictions simply do not apply to prosecutors.2" Asa practical matter, trial judges
sometimes voluntarily apply the defendant's constitutional procedural protections
to the government as well in the interest of general faimess, but they are not required
to do so. 294 Until we acknowledge the issue of discriminatory acquittal, we lack any
constitutional language to give impetus to such protections.
287 Id. at 44.
288 Id. at 44-45.
289 Id. at 55-56. Neither side made this argument to the Court. The Court defined the injury
to jurors narrowly, as injury stemming from the act of being stereotyped, not because of a more
collective right of racial minorities to representative justice in the criminal justice system.
290 Id. at 49.
291 Id.
292 Why does it matter that the Court reached the right result in that case for the wrong
reasons? Because the McCollum Court weakened its ruling by ignoring the most important
interests at stake, those of victims. The dissenters lambasted the majority for trumping the rights
of criminal defendants with the seemingly less important rights of the public to confidence
in the criminal justice system and ofjurors against unstated race consciousness. Id. at 68-69
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Accordingly, a trial judge enforcing the highly subjective Batson
inquiry against a defense lawyer would lack a description of the constitutional urgency of
such protections.
293 Appellate courts lack the opportunity to announce such procedural protections because
of the double jeopardy ban on prosecutive appeals. Interlocutory appeals like McCollum
remain rare.
294 There are times when a defense lawyer would have no interest in invoking such rights
and would strenuously object to their application to protect the government, as in McCollum.
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So, for example, the district attorneys prosecuting the Los Angeles police offi-
cers charged with beating Rodney King could not have cited the racial justice impli-
cations of the trial for Rodney King. 95 Instead, they could only assert general notions
of fairness and the reputation of the criminal justice system. And, to use the Court's
reasoning in McCollum, they could have correctly predicted riots in Los Angeles by
those protesting the lack of equal protection for African-Americans by the criminal
justice system.
The most important of the procedural protections against jury discrimination
should be expanded to prevent discriminatory acquittals. First, prosecutors should
share with defendants the right to voir dire potential jurors about their prejudices,
to root out potential bias before a jury is selected. In Ristaino v. Ross, the Supreme
Court allowed defendants to ask potential jurors about their prejudices during voir
dire.296 While the Court unduly limited that right to cases in which there exists a sub-
stantial likelihood that race will be injected into the trial,297 it remains an important
procedural protection against jury discrimination.298 When racism will obviously be
an issue, defendants have a constitutional right to attempt to identify prejudice before
selecting a jury.
295 See, e.g., Amar & Marcus, supra note 254, at 3 (proposing an exception to double jeop-
ardy for an acquittal occurring after defense counsel racially skewed the jury, but without
reference to the victim's rights).
296 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976). The Court also held in an earlier case that "essential demands
of fairness" may require a judge to ask jurors whether they entertain any racial prejudice.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308,310 (1931). Before ajury is selected, the trial judge
conducts voir dire, questioning potential jurors about their qualifications and backgrounds.
Manyjudges question jurors themselves, though frequently they allow prosecutors and defense
lawyers to do so directly.
297 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596. Defendants enjoy this right only in trials in which the Court
deems that race will clearly be an issue, ignoring empirical evidence that race may more often
than not be an issue. In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), the Court reversed a death
penalty sentence for failure to permit voir dire on racial prejudices simply because the defen-
dant and victim were different races. Yet the Court refused to reverse the murder conviction
itself, reasoning that the possibility of racist discretion was greater in the sentencing context
than in conviction. Id. at 37-38. Justice Brennan, in dissent, decried the injustice of finding
that a particular jury was good enough to convict for murder but not good enough to sentence
to death. "King Solomon did not, in fact, split the baby in two, and had he done so, I suspect
that he would be remembered less for his wisdom than for his hardheartedness." Id. at 44
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
298 See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power",
27 STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975) (describing the importance of voir dire in rooting out potential
discrimination); Richard J. Crawford & Daniel W. Patterson, Exploring and Expanding Voir
Dire Boundaries: A Note to Judges and Trial Lawyers, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 645, 662
(1997) ("Opening up the questioning process is likely to enhance the quality ofjuror screening
without doing violence to the fair trial ideal.").
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Yet, courts have never recognized an equivalent right for prosecutors to voir dire
about potential jury discrimination. 9 Indeed, as the McCollum opinion demonstrated,
until we acknowledge the problem of discriminatory acquittal, courts will have no con-
stitutional language to describe the problem ofjuror prejudice against victims. While
judges may permit prosecutors to conduct such voir dire as a matter of discretion,"
courts frequently avoid allowing counsel to introduce the subject of racial prejudice
for fear of invoking it, as if requiring counsel to ignore the elephant in the room will
make it disappear."'
When the risk of discriminatory acquittal is high, judges should be required to
allow the government to protect the equal protection rights of victims through voir
dire. Prosecutors should be permitted to question potential jurors in the trials of
gender-based violence about their attitudes towards women and the permissibility
of rape or domestic violence.0 2 Prosecutors should be permitted to ask jurors in the
trial of a hate crime questions designed to reveal their racial prejudices.3"3 Such ques-
tioning helps to implement the Sixth Amendment promise of an "impartial jury" by
protecting against unconstitutional discrimination generally.3"
The second important procedural protection at issue is the prohibition on overt
appeals to jury discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors
299 Because double jeopardy prohibits prosecutive appeals, see supra Part III.E, there exists
very little case law articulating any of the rights and interests of the government within our
adversarial system.
" Judges vary widely by jurisdiction and discretion in the leeway they give attorneys in
voir dire. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594 ("Voir dire 'is conducted under the supervision of the
court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion."' (quoting Connors
v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895))).
301 A notion I find as logical as the theory that an absence of sex education will discourage
sex. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself requires this reticence. "In our heterogeneous society
policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as
aperse rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident
of birth, or the choice of religion." Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596, n.8. Courts may be particularly
hesitant to allow the prosecutor to conduct such voir dire when the defendant objects to it. One
can imagine such a situation during McCollum's trial on hate crime charges, for example.
As argued in Part IIl.D, however, defendants have no right to racial jury nullification.
302 See Lucy Fowler, Gender andJuryDeliberations: The Contributions ofSocial Science,
12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1,45 (2005) (discussing use of voir dire to eliminate jurors
with gender prejudices); see also Mark Soler, "A Woman 's Place... ": Combating Sex-Based
Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 535, 538-39 (1975).
303 See Barat S. McClain, Note, Turner's Acceptance ofLimited VoirDire Renders Batson's
Equal Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 273, 306 (1989) (discussing the
importance of voir dire to eliminating jury discrimination without violating Batson's prohi-
bition on presuming such prejudice according to race).
" See supra Part III.D (explaining that the Sixth Amendment permits bias neither for nor
against the defendant).
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from invoking jury discrimination against defendants during trial.3"5 Acknowledging
discriminatory acquittal should extend that prohibition to defense counsels' appeals
to discriminate against victims. Inviting the jury to discriminate against either the de-
fendant or the victim because of race or gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.3"
While judges routinely attempt to rein in such appeals from defense counsel in the
interests of evidentiary relevance, generic fairness, or the reputation of the criminal
justice system, they are not currently required to police the equal protection rights
of victims. When the lawyers representing Emmett Till's killers called the jurors
"custodians of American civilization," required to do their "Anglo-Saxon" duty and
to release his clients, they violated more than the decorum of the Court or the rules
of relevancy." 7 Overt appeals to racial and gender discrimination violate the Equal
Protection Clause just as much from a defense lawyer as from a prosecutor. Appeal-
ing to juror prejudice has no place in a system of justice.
As described above in Part II, the difficulty of remedying jury discrimination
requires us to rely on criminal procedures designed to prevent jury discrimination be-
fore it occurs. °8 The continuing occurrence of discriminatory convictions shows that
such procedures do not always work, but they remain our best effort to preserve the
hope of equal justice. Prosecutors should have the same rights as defense counsel to
try to prevent unconstitutional jury discrimination. Acknowledging discriminatory
acquittal will create constitutional language to do so.
CONCLUSION
In his dissent to McCleskey, Justice Brennan imagined a poignant conversation
between McCleskey and his lawyer about the chances that the jury would sentence
him to death. "A candid reply to this question would have been disturbing" because
of the enormous impact of race on the chances that McCleskey would receive the
death penalty.3" Throughout our history, equally candid conversations with minority
and female crime victims have explained the reverse lesson, that certain kinds of
crimes will go unpunished. African-American parents have taught their children that
there may be no consequences for hate crimes, and that juries simply do not care as
much about violence within black communities. Mothers of all races have taught their
305 See generally Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1992) (discussing prohi-
bition on prosecutorial appeal to racism against defendant, the lack of cases addressing gender
discrimination, and proposing a stronger prohibition on both).
'06 See supra Part HII.D (arguing that defendants have no right to a discriminatory jury
nullification).
307 See TILL-MOBLEY & BENSON, supra note 1; ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 47,
at 100.
308 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987).
'09 Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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daughters that rapes and domestic violence happen with impunity, particularly if their
daughters step outside of the bounds of acceptable female behavior. The criminal
justice system does not provide equal protection of the law. Private violence against
women and minorities succeeds in limiting the freedom of these groups far more than
direct government discrimination ever could. Discriminatory acquittals are at the root
of this problem.
Acknowledging discriminatory acquittal raises this issue as a problem of con-
stitutional import for the first time. It recognizes that jury verdicts are state action
governed by the Equal Protection Clause. It makes clear that the defendant's right
to jury lenity does not include a right to discriminate against victims. It situates the
rights of victims within the criminal justice system, and gives judges and prosecutors
constitutional language to protect them from jury discrimination.
